Notes
1 Already at the beginning of the 1990s, in its white paper on development cooperation ‘A World of Difference’, the Dutch Government did not hesitate to speak about a crisis: ‘a crisis in the development process, in development thinking, in development policy (and) in “the system”’. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991, 35]
2 The figures are 1292 million for 1990 and 1169 million for 1999.
3 Falling into poverty does not imply that all entitlements are lost at the same time. Regress is a process, whereby losing one entitlement will result in the loss of others. Michael Cernea has described such a process, starting with landlessness. When there is a parallel loss of access to common property and no access to an income-earning job, homelessness may result. This leads to marginalisation, food insecurity and increased morbidity, which will result in both social disarticulation and a short life. [Cernea, 1995] Progress out of poverty, on the other hand, can also start with basic entitlements. When these ensure a minimum level of living within a community and guarantee that the fruits of one’s efforts to broaden the entitlements or to use them in a more productive manner without diminishing their future capacity stay with the person – or the household – concerned, that community can embark upon a path towards sustainable human development, provided that the future capacity of these entitlements will not diminish due to their present use. This was the core message of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, as elaborated in the Principles laid down in Agenda 21. [United Nations, 1992]
4 A better yardstick than an index of income poverty is the Human Development Index, developed by UNDP. This composite index is based on four indicators: per capita income, life expectancy, literacy and school enrolment. The Human Poverty Index, also developed by UNDP, is based on four poverty indicators: access to water, birth weight, life expectancy and adult illiteracy. All these indicators are related to the Millennium Development Goals. Both indices include a measure of the level of education, but the Human Development Index also refers to changes at this level, by explicitly including enrolment data. To become an index of sustainable development it would have to be based on indicators related to energy and the environment (natural resources, biodiversity). As an index of human deprivation the Human Poverty Index is better than the Human Development Index, because of the inclusion of water and nutrition indicators. However, there are no time series available. Half of all developing countries for which it was possible to calculate the Human Poverty Index (47 out of 94) had an index of over 30, meaning that more than 30% of the people of these countries are considered to be very poor. India, South Africa and Nigeria all had an index of slightly more than 30. For most African countries the index lies between 40 and 60. [UNDP, 2003, 245/7]
5 Even the trend based on a day is less promising than politicians are made to believe. Of 67 countries for which data is available, 37 experienced an increase in poverty in the 1990s, measured according to this shallow yardstick. [UNDP, 2003, 41] Measurement using the Human Development Index reveals a similar pattern: while this index improved in most countries during the last quarter of the previous century, more than 20 countries experienced a drop in this index in the 1990s. [UNDP, 2003, 40]
6 According to a rough estimate by the World Bank, 2.5 to 3 billion people currently live on less than a day. [World Bank, 2003]
7 With a Gini coefficient of 0.66.
8 Global quintile disparity, which was 30 to 1 in 1960, rose to 60 to 1 in 1990. Disparity between the richest 5% and the poorest 5% was still wider. In the 1990s it was, according to an estimate by Milanovic, 114 to 1, while the richest 1% received as much as the poorest 57% [Milanovic, 2002]
9 De Gaay Fortman has introduced a useful distinction between growth pro-poor (growth with redistribution to such an extent that together they will lead to less inequality and to poverty reduction) and pro-poor growth, based on income generation by the poor themselves. [De Gaay Fortman, 2002] Pro-poor growth does not only rely on redistribution after growth, but on direct increases in the productivity and incomes of the poor themselves. That means that pro-poor goes beyond a combination of safety nets and adequate expenditure on social sectors and public services. Pro-poor growth implies all this, but in addition changes the structure of production and employment as well as the allocation and use of capital, land and technology that would directly increase the income earning capacity of the poor. This would come close to the distinction between redistribution (of income) after and (of assets) before growth. The latter was strongly advocated by Irma Adelman: ‘For equitable growth, at each stage of the development process, access to the critical factor of production should be redistributed before its productivity is improved’ [Adelman, 1979, 165] Defining growth pro-poor as growth cum redistribution and pro-poor growth as redistribution before growth would make more sense than distinguishing between high, moderate and less inequality in conjunction with high or (s)low growth, leading to less or more poverty alleviation, whereby everything is called pro-poor, but some approaches ‘highly pro-poor’ and others just ‘pro-poor’, even when inequality is worsening. As indicated by de Gaay Fortman, the only reason to introduce such a confusing and euphemistic distinction is political: a stricter definition would reveal that no Asian country could be qualified as ‘pro-poor’. [De Gaay Fortman, 2003, 152] Indeed, ‘(the) ideal strategy (which) would boost growth, reduce inequality and significantly reduce poverty … has not been seen in any of the spells recorded for Asia and the Pacific in the 1990s.’ [United Nations, 2003, 44]
10 De Gaay Fortman uses the term productivism to highlight the inner logic of the economic system itself: economic growth has side effects, which should be alleviated with the help of public expenditure, the financing of which would require even more growth. [De Gaay Fortman, 2002, 13]. Precisely this vicious circle gave rise to the concept of sustainable development, as an alternative to productivism. Roefie Hueting was the first economist who, essentially following theories of welfare economics, drew attention to this and developed the concept of the sustainable national income, that would not include the value of production to compensate for side effects that would affect people’s welfare negatively. [Hueting, 1974, 2001]
11 A rights-based approach to poverty is usually juxtaposed with the needs-based approach, which dominated the debate in the 1970s. Berma Klein Goldewijk has rightly pointed out that such a juxtaposition is questionable: ‘ … not all needs justify rights and it is not need alone which justifies a right’. [Klein Goldewijk, 2003, 182] However, Klein Goldewijk then continues by juxtaposing a rights-based approach and a development approach: ‘A rights-based approach … recognises that all people are subjects of rights, rather than objects of development. … In practice, a development approach is predominantly resource-based. … A rights-based approach … is primarily access-based.’ [idem] This seems to imply a definition of the concept of development in macro terms, whereby the development approach would have to be complemented, corrected or substituted by a rights-based approach. However, if development itself is defined in terms of people (sustainable human development) a rights-based approach would not have to be juxtaposed to a development approach. On the contrary, it would become the highest form of a development approach. However, we should beware both of artificial distinctions and of wishful conceptualising. Whatever definition is chosen, what matters is the right to take care of one’s own needs, together with the right to be treated equally.
12 In nearly all developing countries income redistribution, affirmative action and demand-driven approaches have been accepted and applied more or less, but not the redistribution of assets such as land and other resources. This also applies to development policies pursued by international development institutions. In a review of World Bank policies to redress poverty amongst indigenous groups in Latin America, Maarten van den Berg observes that the Bank promotes all means short of a more equitable distribution of land (for instance with the help of funds to enable small indigenous farmers to purchase land) . Van den Berg concludes that the range of demands which the Bank is prepared to consider is limited, aiming at best at achieving equal opportunities, not at overcoming natural social inequality. [Berg, van den, 2002]
13 The 1% aid target was not an arbitrary choice, nor a figure solely resulting from an enquiry into the willingness of rich countries to provide aid. The 1% figure resulted from model calculations: an increase of the growth rate of the developing countries to the level of 5% would require a specific increase in the investments in developing countries, on the basis of specific assumptions concerning investment/growth relations. Part of these could be financed out of domestic savings, the remainder had to be provided from outside. That remainder was a figure, which could also be calculated as a percentage of the total income of the wealthy nations. That calculation indeed resulted in the 1% figure. So the aid target was a political target to the extent that it implied a promise, a commitment. But it was also a technical-economic target. It resulted from development theory: the two gap theory (trade gap and savings gap) concerning foreign exchange limitations to a policy to step up productive investments. It was also a sophisticated target in political terms. The theory implied that the faster the income of developing countries increased, the sooner their capacity to raise domestic savings would grow and, so, the quicker their need for additional foreign aid to complement these savings in order to sustain the growth rate would be reduced. This meant that more aid in the early years would result in less demand for aid later on. This was politically attractive for donor countries. It would be less costly, given specific discount rates. The accumulated aid over a longer period would have to be smaller if donors were generous in the beginning. So the First Development Decade (DD I) could be seen in more than one respect as a win/win approach.
14 During DD I, difficult discussions already emerged with regard to the commitments of the donor countries. During UNCTAD I an II, in 1964 and 1968, aid commitments were modified. The preparations for the Second Development Decade (DD II) resulted in a controversy between two approaches: the World Bank-based Pearson Committee, less ambitious, and the UN-based Committee for Development Planning led by Jan Tinbergen, aiming at a higher growth target and higher levels of official development assistance. The dispute circled around a number of issues which have remained dominant throughout. First the growth objective: should a more or a less ambitious target be selected? Second; should the resulting necessary foreign exchange be brought together through official channels, or should a specific part be left to the private sector, even if in a free market system no firm commitments could be expected from the private sector. In addition to this a change in the statistical base was agreed: instead of Net National Income (NNI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was chosen, which was roughly – too roughly – estimated to be about 30% higher. So, the aid target – 1% of NNI – was recalculated (and rounded off downwards) at 0.7% of the GDP of the donor countries. All this resulted in less firm aid commitments for DD II (1971-1980) than for DD I. The first Review and Appraisal of performance during that decade, in 1972, already made clear that the targets would not be met. That also became clear during UNCTAD III in Santiago. Shortly afterwards the oil crisis broke out, resulting in an instant fourfold increase in world oil prices. Developing countries importing oil were also hit, but oil-exporting developing countries were able to keep the ranks closed within the group of developing countries (G77) by promising compensation. Moreover, the developing countries as a whole were disillusioned by the meagre results of international trade negotiations and by the low aid performance. Therefore they stuck together during UN negotiations on the so called New International Economic Order in 1974 and 1975. The negotiations resulted in consensus on an action programme aimed at establishing a new order, including the reconfirmation of aid commitments. However, all this remained on paper only. (OPEC’s promise also resulted in fewer disbursements than had been expected. Efforts to link oil revenue with investments in food security in poor countries did not materialise. Instead, oil revenue became an important source of finance for arms imports). The Review and Appraisal of DD II became a purely statistical exercise. The Third Development Decade (1981-1990) did not draw political attention. The negotiations only served the needs of the UN bureaucracy and the diplomats. The outcome was a strategy without teeth, without any political commitment. Hardly anybody outside New York was aware that, within the framework of the United Nations, the 1990s were proclaimed the Fourth Development Decade.
15 Some goals have been achieved wholly (the eradication of smallpox). Others were achieved partly (the immunisation of children) or better in some parts of the world than in others, whereby in global terms at least there was substantial improvement (primary school enrolment and nutrition). Most others failed completely. This has led to criticism of goal setting as such: goals are seen as inflexible, over-ambitious, too precise, too detailed and therefore deceptive. Against this criticism the authors of the Human Development Report 2003 argue that ‘whether the numerical target of a global goal was achieved is an important but inadequate measure of success, because it does not indicate whether setting the goal made a difference. In many cases enormous progress has been made even though numerical targets have not been reached … Thus global goals can raise ambitions and spur efforts …. They are intended to mobilise action ….’ [UNDP, 2003, 30-31]. Also Richard Jolly, in an overview of all relevant goals set and agreed by the world community in the second half of the previous century, is rather generous when claiming that on the whole many goals have been achieved in a considerable number of countries by the target date or soon thereafter. He pleads for a shift in the emphasis, from achievement or non-achievement to the extent to which the goals have functioned and for an analysis of the specific reasons why specific goals in specific countries have not been achieved: internal reasons (economic constraints, lack of political commitment, violent conflict) or external: the international economic environment or lack of international support. [Jolly, 2003] Such an analysis would be useful. However, goals and targets are more than catalysts in a process of awareness building. They are not only meant to mobilise action by others. They imply also a commitment to act by the goal setters themselves. All goals concerned were agreed worldwide and embedded in global political declarations, after full scrutiny – ‘carefully constructed, word by word, often syllable by syllable’ [Jolly, 2003, 4] – and hardly any of these implied a 100% eradication of a deficit in a relatively short period. It was always a decrease of an incidence with a specific percentage, say, a third, within a period of about 15 years. The targets always concerned basic issues. Their achievement was considered fundamental for human welfare. Their non-achievement is failure. The reasons should be analysed, but such an analysis would not clear in advance political leaders from their accountability.
16 With thanks to Richard Jolly and Kitty van der Heijden.
17 See for the Development Compact [UNDP, 2003, 15-25]. See for proposed elements of such a compact concerning debt, trade, technology and AIDS policy respectively pp.152/3, 154/6, 157/9 and 158/9. Privatisation and its limitations in various sectors are discussed on pp 111-121, decentralisation on pp 135-140, social mobilisation on pp.140-143. Desirable policies concerning food, education, health, and water and sanitation are discussed in chapter 4 of the report [UNDP, 2003, 85-110]
18 Richard Jolly, though rather kind in his judgement concerning the non-fulfilment of the various development targets of the decades behind us, is quite outspoken in his verdict on the Bretton Woods Institutions, whose ‘single-minded focus …. (and) …. narrow view …. often diverted attention from the social dimensions of adjustment, set back progress in the social sectors, and worked against the achievement of global goals in education, health, water and nutrition.’ [Jolly, 2003, 4]
19 Fairness requires that I note I was a member of this task force.
20 Moreover, as was recently also indicated by Ton Dietz, for half of the world’s poor, meeting the target only would require a redistribution of at least this figure. [Dietz, 2003, 14] This should mostly be additional to current aid flows, because reallocation would also harm the capacity to meet the other targets.
21 NRC Handelsblad, July 22, 2003, p. 7.
22 Internal memorandum, 17 September 2003.
23 See for instance [UNDP, 2003, pp. 88,94,97,101,108] and [UN-Habitat 2003]
2 The figures are 1292 million for 1990 and 1169 million for 1999.
3 Falling into poverty does not imply that all entitlements are lost at the same time. Regress is a process, whereby losing one entitlement will result in the loss of others. Michael Cernea has described such a process, starting with landlessness. When there is a parallel loss of access to common property and no access to an income-earning job, homelessness may result. This leads to marginalisation, food insecurity and increased morbidity, which will result in both social disarticulation and a short life. [Cernea, 1995] Progress out of poverty, on the other hand, can also start with basic entitlements. When these ensure a minimum level of living within a community and guarantee that the fruits of one’s efforts to broaden the entitlements or to use them in a more productive manner without diminishing their future capacity stay with the person – or the household – concerned, that community can embark upon a path towards sustainable human development, provided that the future capacity of these entitlements will not diminish due to their present use. This was the core message of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, as elaborated in the Principles laid down in Agenda 21. [United Nations, 1992]
4 A better yardstick than an index of income poverty is the Human Development Index, developed by UNDP. This composite index is based on four indicators: per capita income, life expectancy, literacy and school enrolment. The Human Poverty Index, also developed by UNDP, is based on four poverty indicators: access to water, birth weight, life expectancy and adult illiteracy. All these indicators are related to the Millennium Development Goals. Both indices include a measure of the level of education, but the Human Development Index also refers to changes at this level, by explicitly including enrolment data. To become an index of sustainable development it would have to be based on indicators related to energy and the environment (natural resources, biodiversity). As an index of human deprivation the Human Poverty Index is better than the Human Development Index, because of the inclusion of water and nutrition indicators. However, there are no time series available. Half of all developing countries for which it was possible to calculate the Human Poverty Index (47 out of 94) had an index of over 30, meaning that more than 30% of the people of these countries are considered to be very poor. India, South Africa and Nigeria all had an index of slightly more than 30. For most African countries the index lies between 40 and 60. [UNDP, 2003, 245/7]
5 Even the trend based on a day is less promising than politicians are made to believe. Of 67 countries for which data is available, 37 experienced an increase in poverty in the 1990s, measured according to this shallow yardstick. [UNDP, 2003, 41] Measurement using the Human Development Index reveals a similar pattern: while this index improved in most countries during the last quarter of the previous century, more than 20 countries experienced a drop in this index in the 1990s. [UNDP, 2003, 40]
6 According to a rough estimate by the World Bank, 2.5 to 3 billion people currently live on less than a day. [World Bank, 2003]
7 With a Gini coefficient of 0.66.
8 Global quintile disparity, which was 30 to 1 in 1960, rose to 60 to 1 in 1990. Disparity between the richest 5% and the poorest 5% was still wider. In the 1990s it was, according to an estimate by Milanovic, 114 to 1, while the richest 1% received as much as the poorest 57% [Milanovic, 2002]
9 De Gaay Fortman has introduced a useful distinction between growth pro-poor (growth with redistribution to such an extent that together they will lead to less inequality and to poverty reduction) and pro-poor growth, based on income generation by the poor themselves. [De Gaay Fortman, 2002] Pro-poor growth does not only rely on redistribution after growth, but on direct increases in the productivity and incomes of the poor themselves. That means that pro-poor goes beyond a combination of safety nets and adequate expenditure on social sectors and public services. Pro-poor growth implies all this, but in addition changes the structure of production and employment as well as the allocation and use of capital, land and technology that would directly increase the income earning capacity of the poor. This would come close to the distinction between redistribution (of income) after and (of assets) before growth. The latter was strongly advocated by Irma Adelman: ‘For equitable growth, at each stage of the development process, access to the critical factor of production should be redistributed before its productivity is improved’ [Adelman, 1979, 165] Defining growth pro-poor as growth cum redistribution and pro-poor growth as redistribution before growth would make more sense than distinguishing between high, moderate and less inequality in conjunction with high or (s)low growth, leading to less or more poverty alleviation, whereby everything is called pro-poor, but some approaches ‘highly pro-poor’ and others just ‘pro-poor’, even when inequality is worsening. As indicated by de Gaay Fortman, the only reason to introduce such a confusing and euphemistic distinction is political: a stricter definition would reveal that no Asian country could be qualified as ‘pro-poor’. [De Gaay Fortman, 2003, 152] Indeed, ‘(the) ideal strategy (which) would boost growth, reduce inequality and significantly reduce poverty … has not been seen in any of the spells recorded for Asia and the Pacific in the 1990s.’ [United Nations, 2003, 44]
10 De Gaay Fortman uses the term productivism to highlight the inner logic of the economic system itself: economic growth has side effects, which should be alleviated with the help of public expenditure, the financing of which would require even more growth. [De Gaay Fortman, 2002, 13]. Precisely this vicious circle gave rise to the concept of sustainable development, as an alternative to productivism. Roefie Hueting was the first economist who, essentially following theories of welfare economics, drew attention to this and developed the concept of the sustainable national income, that would not include the value of production to compensate for side effects that would affect people’s welfare negatively. [Hueting, 1974, 2001]
11 A rights-based approach to poverty is usually juxtaposed with the needs-based approach, which dominated the debate in the 1970s. Berma Klein Goldewijk has rightly pointed out that such a juxtaposition is questionable: ‘ … not all needs justify rights and it is not need alone which justifies a right’. [Klein Goldewijk, 2003, 182] However, Klein Goldewijk then continues by juxtaposing a rights-based approach and a development approach: ‘A rights-based approach … recognises that all people are subjects of rights, rather than objects of development. … In practice, a development approach is predominantly resource-based. … A rights-based approach … is primarily access-based.’ [idem] This seems to imply a definition of the concept of development in macro terms, whereby the development approach would have to be complemented, corrected or substituted by a rights-based approach. However, if development itself is defined in terms of people (sustainable human development) a rights-based approach would not have to be juxtaposed to a development approach. On the contrary, it would become the highest form of a development approach. However, we should beware both of artificial distinctions and of wishful conceptualising. Whatever definition is chosen, what matters is the right to take care of one’s own needs, together with the right to be treated equally.
12 In nearly all developing countries income redistribution, affirmative action and demand-driven approaches have been accepted and applied more or less, but not the redistribution of assets such as land and other resources. This also applies to development policies pursued by international development institutions. In a review of World Bank policies to redress poverty amongst indigenous groups in Latin America, Maarten van den Berg observes that the Bank promotes all means short of a more equitable distribution of land (for instance with the help of funds to enable small indigenous farmers to purchase land) . Van den Berg concludes that the range of demands which the Bank is prepared to consider is limited, aiming at best at achieving equal opportunities, not at overcoming natural social inequality. [Berg, van den, 2002]
13 The 1% aid target was not an arbitrary choice, nor a figure solely resulting from an enquiry into the willingness of rich countries to provide aid. The 1% figure resulted from model calculations: an increase of the growth rate of the developing countries to the level of 5% would require a specific increase in the investments in developing countries, on the basis of specific assumptions concerning investment/growth relations. Part of these could be financed out of domestic savings, the remainder had to be provided from outside. That remainder was a figure, which could also be calculated as a percentage of the total income of the wealthy nations. That calculation indeed resulted in the 1% figure. So the aid target was a political target to the extent that it implied a promise, a commitment. But it was also a technical-economic target. It resulted from development theory: the two gap theory (trade gap and savings gap) concerning foreign exchange limitations to a policy to step up productive investments. It was also a sophisticated target in political terms. The theory implied that the faster the income of developing countries increased, the sooner their capacity to raise domestic savings would grow and, so, the quicker their need for additional foreign aid to complement these savings in order to sustain the growth rate would be reduced. This meant that more aid in the early years would result in less demand for aid later on. This was politically attractive for donor countries. It would be less costly, given specific discount rates. The accumulated aid over a longer period would have to be smaller if donors were generous in the beginning. So the First Development Decade (DD I) could be seen in more than one respect as a win/win approach.
14 During DD I, difficult discussions already emerged with regard to the commitments of the donor countries. During UNCTAD I an II, in 1964 and 1968, aid commitments were modified. The preparations for the Second Development Decade (DD II) resulted in a controversy between two approaches: the World Bank-based Pearson Committee, less ambitious, and the UN-based Committee for Development Planning led by Jan Tinbergen, aiming at a higher growth target and higher levels of official development assistance. The dispute circled around a number of issues which have remained dominant throughout. First the growth objective: should a more or a less ambitious target be selected? Second; should the resulting necessary foreign exchange be brought together through official channels, or should a specific part be left to the private sector, even if in a free market system no firm commitments could be expected from the private sector. In addition to this a change in the statistical base was agreed: instead of Net National Income (NNI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was chosen, which was roughly – too roughly – estimated to be about 30% higher. So, the aid target – 1% of NNI – was recalculated (and rounded off downwards) at 0.7% of the GDP of the donor countries. All this resulted in less firm aid commitments for DD II (1971-1980) than for DD I. The first Review and Appraisal of performance during that decade, in 1972, already made clear that the targets would not be met. That also became clear during UNCTAD III in Santiago. Shortly afterwards the oil crisis broke out, resulting in an instant fourfold increase in world oil prices. Developing countries importing oil were also hit, but oil-exporting developing countries were able to keep the ranks closed within the group of developing countries (G77) by promising compensation. Moreover, the developing countries as a whole were disillusioned by the meagre results of international trade negotiations and by the low aid performance. Therefore they stuck together during UN negotiations on the so called New International Economic Order in 1974 and 1975. The negotiations resulted in consensus on an action programme aimed at establishing a new order, including the reconfirmation of aid commitments. However, all this remained on paper only. (OPEC’s promise also resulted in fewer disbursements than had been expected. Efforts to link oil revenue with investments in food security in poor countries did not materialise. Instead, oil revenue became an important source of finance for arms imports). The Review and Appraisal of DD II became a purely statistical exercise. The Third Development Decade (1981-1990) did not draw political attention. The negotiations only served the needs of the UN bureaucracy and the diplomats. The outcome was a strategy without teeth, without any political commitment. Hardly anybody outside New York was aware that, within the framework of the United Nations, the 1990s were proclaimed the Fourth Development Decade.
15 Some goals have been achieved wholly (the eradication of smallpox). Others were achieved partly (the immunisation of children) or better in some parts of the world than in others, whereby in global terms at least there was substantial improvement (primary school enrolment and nutrition). Most others failed completely. This has led to criticism of goal setting as such: goals are seen as inflexible, over-ambitious, too precise, too detailed and therefore deceptive. Against this criticism the authors of the Human Development Report 2003 argue that ‘whether the numerical target of a global goal was achieved is an important but inadequate measure of success, because it does not indicate whether setting the goal made a difference. In many cases enormous progress has been made even though numerical targets have not been reached … Thus global goals can raise ambitions and spur efforts …. They are intended to mobilise action ….’ [UNDP, 2003, 30-31]. Also Richard Jolly, in an overview of all relevant goals set and agreed by the world community in the second half of the previous century, is rather generous when claiming that on the whole many goals have been achieved in a considerable number of countries by the target date or soon thereafter. He pleads for a shift in the emphasis, from achievement or non-achievement to the extent to which the goals have functioned and for an analysis of the specific reasons why specific goals in specific countries have not been achieved: internal reasons (economic constraints, lack of political commitment, violent conflict) or external: the international economic environment or lack of international support. [Jolly, 2003] Such an analysis would be useful. However, goals and targets are more than catalysts in a process of awareness building. They are not only meant to mobilise action by others. They imply also a commitment to act by the goal setters themselves. All goals concerned were agreed worldwide and embedded in global political declarations, after full scrutiny – ‘carefully constructed, word by word, often syllable by syllable’ [Jolly, 2003, 4] – and hardly any of these implied a 100% eradication of a deficit in a relatively short period. It was always a decrease of an incidence with a specific percentage, say, a third, within a period of about 15 years. The targets always concerned basic issues. Their achievement was considered fundamental for human welfare. Their non-achievement is failure. The reasons should be analysed, but such an analysis would not clear in advance political leaders from their accountability.
16 With thanks to Richard Jolly and Kitty van der Heijden.
17 See for the Development Compact [UNDP, 2003, 15-25]. See for proposed elements of such a compact concerning debt, trade, technology and AIDS policy respectively pp.152/3, 154/6, 157/9 and 158/9. Privatisation and its limitations in various sectors are discussed on pp 111-121, decentralisation on pp 135-140, social mobilisation on pp.140-143. Desirable policies concerning food, education, health, and water and sanitation are discussed in chapter 4 of the report [UNDP, 2003, 85-110]
18 Richard Jolly, though rather kind in his judgement concerning the non-fulfilment of the various development targets of the decades behind us, is quite outspoken in his verdict on the Bretton Woods Institutions, whose ‘single-minded focus …. (and) …. narrow view …. often diverted attention from the social dimensions of adjustment, set back progress in the social sectors, and worked against the achievement of global goals in education, health, water and nutrition.’ [Jolly, 2003, 4]
19 Fairness requires that I note I was a member of this task force.
20 Moreover, as was recently also indicated by Ton Dietz, for half of the world’s poor, meeting the target only would require a redistribution of at least this figure. [Dietz, 2003, 14] This should mostly be additional to current aid flows, because reallocation would also harm the capacity to meet the other targets.
21 NRC Handelsblad, July 22, 2003, p. 7.
22 Internal memorandum, 17 September 2003.
23 See for instance [UNDP, 2003, pp. 88,94,97,101,108] and [UN-Habitat 2003]