Weblog nr 18
April 7, 2006

It is far from certain that the transition from an African Union peace force in Darfur towards a peace force led by the United Nations will take place before the end of this year. It may even be postponed indefinitely. Early this year the African Union Peace and Security Council, meeting at the level of Ambassadors, had decided to support such a transition. In March the Council met again, this time at ministerial level, and reconfirmed its decision. However, the AU Executive Council seems to be lukewarm to this idea. President Konare has stated that the decision has not yet been made. A transition to the UN is an option, no more than that, and not the preferred option. The other options are an extension of the AU force or a so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, with the AU as its core.

The Security Council of the United Nations has welcomed the idea of a transition. The general feeling is that the AU has done a good job, but hat the force is too small and too weak. In my address to the Council, on 21 March, I emphasised again the need for a robust force, large enough to be everywhere where necessary, strong enough to defend itself and to deter attacks on unarmed civilians, with staying power long enough to ensure full return of all refugees and displaced persons and with a mandate broad enough to protect them and to disarm the militia. I reiterated the statement in my previous address to he Council, in January this year, that our strategy had failed and should be changed. There was not yet peace in Darfur and the killings continued. The Council understood that a more robust approach would be necessary. However, members of the Council were hesitant to decide in favour of a United Nations peace keeping mission without previous consent of the Government of Sudan. Perhaps some would be willing to go ahead. Others, however, stated explicitly that without the Government of Sudan agreeing to such a mission it would be impossible. Consensus amongst the permanent members of the Council in favour of a peace enforcement mission was clearly beyond reach. Whether it is wise to grant the Government of Sudan veto power is debatable, but it is a political reality. In the present circumstances there is no alternative.

The Council unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary General of the United Nations to consult with the Government of Sudan and to reach agreement about sending a United Nations peace keeping mission. However, as I have described in earlier weblogs (see in particular nr 16, 13 March) the Sudanese Government had already rejected United Nations involvement in Darfur. During the Arab Summit, which took place in Khartoum in mid March, the Government, after much lobbying, received support from the member states of the Arab League for its position. The Summit rejected foreign intervention.

So, the member states of the Security Council, the members of the Arab League, the Executive Council of the African Union and also the Government of Sudan, they all agree: no foreign intervention. The only way out would be to put so much pressure on the Government that it would agree. It had done so before. In 13 March 2004 Sudan had rejected proposals to enable the African Union to send a peace force. Since then the Government gradually has given up its resistance. They are now so pleased with the – necessarily weak – performance of the AU that they do not want them to leave anymore and be replaced by a stronger force. One year later the Government declared that it would strongly oppose an involvement of the International Criminal Court. Presently it is cooperating with the Court. I would not exclude the possibility of a similar reversal of the presently negative attitude towards the UN as well. However, that would require time, wise diplomacy, pressure and concerted action by all members of the international community.

There is not much time. From the perspective of the situation on the ground in Darfur every week further delay is detrimental to the people. Wise diplomacy is lacking as well: cautious efforts to persuade the Sudanese to accept the UN, which after all is their own organisation, based on principles of international law, are overshadowed by Western calls in favour of NATO. Such calls scare even moderate Sudanese, who fear a repetition of the Afghani or Iraqi scenario. Pressure is lacking as well. It seems as if the member states of the Security Council expect the UN bureaucracy to deliver the Sudanese consent. That will not be possible. On the contrary, the Sudanese authorities are exerting more and more pressure the other way round. The freedom of movement of my staff in areas such as Kassala and Abyei, working on the basis of our present mandate - the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan - is more and more being curtailed. International Non-Governmental Organisations providing humanitarian assistance in Darfur are persistently harassed by Sudanese authorities, in particular by National Security and Military Intelligence. The Government seems to get away with this quite easily, without much protest from abroad.

Before the Security Council can take further decisions concerning the proposed transition towards a UN peace force in Darfur, it expects to receive an assessment of the situation in Darfur and of the possible modalities of a take-over. It is self evident that his should be a joint assessment, carried out by experts from both the AU and the UN. However, the Government has already declared that an assessment mission would not be welcome. After all, so they say, why would an assessment be necessary if there is no transition? Minister of Foreign Affairs Lam Akol has even declared that a transition, if any, would only imply a change of the present AU mandate into a new AU mandate. So far, the African Union has not corrected this surprising interpretation. Neither has the AU approached the Sudanese authorities requesting permission for an assessment. It seems that we are in a deadlock.

In Abuja there is progress, however. Early this month I paid another visit to the negotiations, my fourth time since the beginning of his year. I concluded that as far as the two substantial chapters are concerned – sharing of power and sharing of wealth – further talks will not help. Time is ripe for decisions, to cut the knot and strike a bargain. This could happen soon. We may expect a fresh position of SPLM within the Government of National Union. SPLM so far has supported its coalition partner, the NCP. However, it has come under pressure to take a more independent and forthcoming stance. From his side President Beshir seems to have instructed his negotiating team to define a possible deal.

The talks concerning the third chapter, security and cease fire arrangements, are also showing some progress. The military experts at both sides are talking with each other. A certain mutual understanding seems to emerge. For the first time the SLA has disclosed the positions which it claims to hold. The mediators have become engaged in some mapping of positions. If parties would recognize each others strengths and positions, mediators could try to convince them to freeze the status quo. Thereupon positions could be consolidated in the medium term, creating space for further peace talks - including the start of an all inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue - and for disarmament and demobilisation.

The African Union intends to reach an agreement around end April. Calling this a deadline would not be credible. The parties, despite the commitments made by all of them, had so clearly disregarded the previous deadline (31 December 2005) that setting a new one would not make much sense. End April is an objective which could be reached, in particular if the parties and the mediators would not aim at complete, unambiguous texts. The text of the so-called Enhanced Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement which seems to emerge from the present talks is much better than the D’Jamena cease fire agreement of May 2004. However, it is also more complicated, because of the zoning of positions, which have to be verified, and the introduction of buffer zones and corridors between the zones, which requires checking and monitoring of troop movements. I am afraid that the African Union peace force in Darfur, given its present size, strength and composition, will not be able to carry out that task. Success in the talks may breed failure on the ground. The only way to avoid a new failure is to bring a more robust force to Darfur. In my view that can only be a UN force.