Weblog nr 32
August 18, 2006
The Darfur Peace Agreement has not brought more security to Darfur. It was signed on 5 May. It was expected that the clashes would continue for some time, until the news about the agreement had reached the commanders on the ground. Indeed, after some weeks violence decreased. The month of June was rather calm. However, in July the situation changed again. Here is the picture.
The ceasefire between the Minawi faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Government of Sudan held throughout the whole period. However, this came at the expense of escalating violence between these two new allies and parties who had not signed the agreement. Early July the Minawi faction captured the town of Korma aligned with the SLA Abdul Wahid faction and attacked his stronghold at Tina. For the rest of the month SLA Minawi elements, often accompanied by armed tribesmen, looted villages and livestock in SLA Abdul Wahid territory around these two places, killing more than hundred civilians. About twenty thousand displaced people arrived in camps, reporting indiscriminate killing, rape and abduction in their villages.
A second wave of violence began with a surprise attack by a new movement, the National Redemption Front, on the town of Hamrath al Sheikh, in North Kordofan, outside Darfur. About twenty people were killed. The NRF declared itself fully against the government as well as against the DPA. The movement seems to be an offspring of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), bringing together quite a few other opponents. The NRF seems to have ample access to finance and weapons and has gained strength as well as territory, in particular in North Darfur. A third wave consists of clashes between the forces of Minawi and a group of commanders, known as the G19, who have split off from both the Minawi faction as well as the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLA. Since mid-July the Minawi faction has clashed repeatedly with G19, attacking their strongholds in Birmaza and Umm Sidir, all in North Darfur. Counter attacks by the G19, in particular around Donkey Hosh, were successful. The Minawi faction, though still controling Musbath, is losing some territory and there are reports about deserters to the G19. There were also reports that the Minawi forces received support from their former enemy, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The G19, on its side, seems to have received support from Chadian military, but it is not clear whether these fighters were sent by the Chadian government or acted on their own initiative. It goes without saying that all reports about new alliances and new atrocities are being denied by the various parties. However, there is enough evidence that all these clashes have resulted in many casualties amongst the fighters and in many human rights violations against unarmed civilians who are accused of supporting ‘the other side’.
The military situation on the ground is volatile. In West Darfur the SAF, apparently assisted by Janjaweed militia, clashed with non-signatory forces in the Jebel Moon, a strategically important mountainous area close to the border with Chad. Since a couple of years the population in that area has been forced to cooperate with various alternating occupying forces. They are fed up with the war and want to support the DPA, but risk reprisal. Around Kulkul, in North Darfur, the SAF seems to have severely clashed with the NRF. There are (unconfirmed) reports about Antonov airplanes used by the SAF, bombing opposite forces and even villages. There is a credible report about the NRF, which in North Darfur has shown its strength by using a SAM 7, a man-portable, shoulder-fired low-altitude surface-to-air missile, claiming to have hit one of these Antonovs. Presently in El Fashr there is a build up of SAF forces, probably preparing themselves for a new confrontation.
Partial wreckage of an aircraft engine with propellor, hit by a SAM-7 in Darfur.
The Government and the Minawi faction have declared all parties that have refused to sign the DPA ‘terrorists’. They have refused to talk with them and feel justified to attack not only the NRF - which more or less started a new civil war - but also the G19. We have tried to convince them that this is not a wise strategy, but, so far, without success. The G19 is basically anti-Minawi, while the NRF is basically anti-Government. It should not be too difficult to start talks with the G19 and bring them on board. However, the G19, under attack, feels compelled to seek support from wherever, be it NRF, JEM or Chad. Treating all non-signatories as terrorists brings them together and renders it impossible to talk. The Government and the Minawi faction, taking this position, feel themselves backed by statements made by Western diplomats and politicians who, shortly after the signing of the peace agreement, blamed all non-signatories and spoke about terrorists, who should be sanctioned. The Government and the Minawi faction have even denied the other parties access to meetings of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC). The message is: first you should sign and then you get access. This may seem logical, but it implies that none of the clashes, violations or atrocities, carried out by any party, can be addressed. The non-signatories are bound to earlier ceasefire agreements (such as the N’Djamena agreement of 2004) and protocols, which they violate when attacking the SAF or Minawi’s forces. They could be held accountable in the CFC, but neither the Government nor the Minawi action seems to be interested in doing so. The latter appear to prefer to continue military activities - justified in their view, because directed against non-signatories - with the objective to strengthen and expand the territory which they control, without accounting for this conduct in the CFC. The African Union, chairing the CFC, has accepted this. A couple of days ago the AU decided to suspend the non-signatories from this commission, ‘following the paralysis of this mechanism’. This decision will paralyse the mechanism further. The AU has declared that the decision was taken after consultation with international partners in the CFC. UNMIS is one of those partners. We have strongly argued against such an approach and have suggested a number of workable alternatives. All of them have been rejected.
Not only the non-signatories which are fighting, but also those who refrain from military action, have been denied access to the CFC. One of those is the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLA. Abdul Wahid has rejected the formation of the NRF and condemned the attacks launched by the new Front. Here again is a potential partner for an enriched Darfur Peace Agreement, but so far the Government and the Minawi faction have refused to respond to Abdul Wahid’s demands. There is no pressure from the international community to begin new talks. On the contrary, Abdul Wahid is seen as a spoiler. Instead, efforts have been made to approach possible dissenters in his movement and to further split his faction. As a result last month a new faction was established: “SLA Classic’, the supporters of which are considered more reasonable than Abdul Wahid. It is the classical approach of weakening an opponent by seduction, always successful in the short tem, never in the long run. What is ultimately decisive is popular support: amongst the commanders and fighters in the field, the displaced persons in the camps and the people in the villages and in the mountains. Overall popular support cannot be guaranteed by divide and rule tactics.
A fourth wave of violence consists of traditional tribal fighting. Tribes clash with each other because of disputes about land and water. Last month around Gereida in South Darfur a quarrel between nomads and herders about grazing land for camels led to a clash between two tribes, the Reizegat and the Habaniya, resulting in 150 deaths. The figure is high, but the phenomenon as such is no exception. Though these disputes are not directly related to the DPA, their root causes can only be addressed in the framework of tribal reconciliation in combination with a programme of reconstruction of resources of water and land. This should be guaranteed by political, legal and social institutions whose functioning requires the implementation of the peace agreement.
A fifth wave of violence concerns villagers and displaced people. Militia groups continue to operate with impunity throughout Darfur, attacking villages, killing villagers, raping women, stealing livestock and harassing IDPs in and around the camps. Some militias have settled in cleared villages in West Darfur and are cultivating the land. In some places they are keeping the people in virtual slavery, preventing them from leaving and regularly assaulting women. Elsewhere they beat up displaced persons who try to return to their own village in order to cultivate their land and tell them to stay away and never to come back, if they don’t want to be killed.
A sixth wave of violence consists of increased banditry. Around El Geneina in West Darfur, between Nyala and El Fashr and in quite a few other areas in all three Darfurs bandits are looting and killing. Attacks on convoys have grown increasingly brazen. Together with the clashes between the parties this has resulted in stalling a considerable part of our humanitarian operations. These operations are also affected by polarization in the camps. Groups against the DPA oppose those who are in favour. In a number of camps this is resulting in tribal fights, in particular between Fur and Zaghawa. In the camps there are plenty of weapons. They are used to deter possible attackers - Janjaweed are still roaming around camps and continue to harass and rape women and girls - , but also to raid cattle, risking retaliation. In the camps law and order gradually dissolve. Elder traditional leaders are losing their authority. Youth groups are becoming more and more violent. The environment is rife with rumors. Recently humanitarian workers were accused of poisoning drinking water, food and even plastic sheeting and of spying for the Government. In July six Sudanese staff members working for aid agencies were killed.
Aid agencies, in particular non-governmental organisations, are vulnerable. Cars are hijacked, drivers are killed. So far, UN agencies have not been attacked in Darfur. However, the African Union is under attack. In the first seven months of 2006 the number of security incidents affecting the NGO’s increased with 75% in comparison with the first seven months of last year. Violent activities targeting the African Union increased even more: with 900%! Not only bandits, youth gangs and militia have clashed with AMIS military and police units, but also rebel SLA troops, accusing AMIS of partiality.
Three months after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement the picture is bleak. Nobody expected that security would be restored at once. But presently the situation is worse than in the last three months before the signing of the agreement and it is deteriorating. There is fragmentation of parties. There is complete denial of ceasefire violations as well as of human rights violations. They are not addressed, let alone sanctioned. The agreement was meant to cement the parties together, but it has become a source of further disruption.
The solution of this crisis should be found, first, by enforcing the implementation of what has been agreed, rather than allowing the Government and the Minawi faction to disregard their commitments. Second, by getting all parties on board (instead of alienating dissenters and attacking non-signatories) and inviting them to participate in all inclusive Darfurian institutions, whether they have signed the agreement or not (yet). Third, by starting an all inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue as soon as possible and by linking this dialogue with reconstruction, return and reconciliation programmes, irrespective of the political stance of the groups concerned. Last but not least, by establishing a robust international peace force, capable to deter and contain old and new assailants, Janjaweed as well as NRF, bandits as well as warlords. The DPA is more than a security arrangement. However, without an improving security situation all other elements of the DPA are bound to fail.
The ceasefire between the Minawi faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Government of Sudan held throughout the whole period. However, this came at the expense of escalating violence between these two new allies and parties who had not signed the agreement. Early July the Minawi faction captured the town of Korma aligned with the SLA Abdul Wahid faction and attacked his stronghold at Tina. For the rest of the month SLA Minawi elements, often accompanied by armed tribesmen, looted villages and livestock in SLA Abdul Wahid territory around these two places, killing more than hundred civilians. About twenty thousand displaced people arrived in camps, reporting indiscriminate killing, rape and abduction in their villages.
A second wave of violence began with a surprise attack by a new movement, the National Redemption Front, on the town of Hamrath al Sheikh, in North Kordofan, outside Darfur. About twenty people were killed. The NRF declared itself fully against the government as well as against the DPA. The movement seems to be an offspring of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), bringing together quite a few other opponents. The NRF seems to have ample access to finance and weapons and has gained strength as well as territory, in particular in North Darfur. A third wave consists of clashes between the forces of Minawi and a group of commanders, known as the G19, who have split off from both the Minawi faction as well as the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLA. Since mid-July the Minawi faction has clashed repeatedly with G19, attacking their strongholds in Birmaza and Umm Sidir, all in North Darfur. Counter attacks by the G19, in particular around Donkey Hosh, were successful. The Minawi faction, though still controling Musbath, is losing some territory and there are reports about deserters to the G19. There were also reports that the Minawi forces received support from their former enemy, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The G19, on its side, seems to have received support from Chadian military, but it is not clear whether these fighters were sent by the Chadian government or acted on their own initiative. It goes without saying that all reports about new alliances and new atrocities are being denied by the various parties. However, there is enough evidence that all these clashes have resulted in many casualties amongst the fighters and in many human rights violations against unarmed civilians who are accused of supporting ‘the other side’.
The military situation on the ground is volatile. In West Darfur the SAF, apparently assisted by Janjaweed militia, clashed with non-signatory forces in the Jebel Moon, a strategically important mountainous area close to the border with Chad. Since a couple of years the population in that area has been forced to cooperate with various alternating occupying forces. They are fed up with the war and want to support the DPA, but risk reprisal. Around Kulkul, in North Darfur, the SAF seems to have severely clashed with the NRF. There are (unconfirmed) reports about Antonov airplanes used by the SAF, bombing opposite forces and even villages. There is a credible report about the NRF, which in North Darfur has shown its strength by using a SAM 7, a man-portable, shoulder-fired low-altitude surface-to-air missile, claiming to have hit one of these Antonovs. Presently in El Fashr there is a build up of SAF forces, probably preparing themselves for a new confrontation.
Partial wreckage of an aircraft engine with propellor, hit by a SAM-7 in Darfur.
Not only the non-signatories which are fighting, but also those who refrain from military action, have been denied access to the CFC. One of those is the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLA. Abdul Wahid has rejected the formation of the NRF and condemned the attacks launched by the new Front. Here again is a potential partner for an enriched Darfur Peace Agreement, but so far the Government and the Minawi faction have refused to respond to Abdul Wahid’s demands. There is no pressure from the international community to begin new talks. On the contrary, Abdul Wahid is seen as a spoiler. Instead, efforts have been made to approach possible dissenters in his movement and to further split his faction. As a result last month a new faction was established: “SLA Classic’, the supporters of which are considered more reasonable than Abdul Wahid. It is the classical approach of weakening an opponent by seduction, always successful in the short tem, never in the long run. What is ultimately decisive is popular support: amongst the commanders and fighters in the field, the displaced persons in the camps and the people in the villages and in the mountains. Overall popular support cannot be guaranteed by divide and rule tactics.
A fourth wave of violence consists of traditional tribal fighting. Tribes clash with each other because of disputes about land and water. Last month around Gereida in South Darfur a quarrel between nomads and herders about grazing land for camels led to a clash between two tribes, the Reizegat and the Habaniya, resulting in 150 deaths. The figure is high, but the phenomenon as such is no exception. Though these disputes are not directly related to the DPA, their root causes can only be addressed in the framework of tribal reconciliation in combination with a programme of reconstruction of resources of water and land. This should be guaranteed by political, legal and social institutions whose functioning requires the implementation of the peace agreement.
A fifth wave of violence concerns villagers and displaced people. Militia groups continue to operate with impunity throughout Darfur, attacking villages, killing villagers, raping women, stealing livestock and harassing IDPs in and around the camps. Some militias have settled in cleared villages in West Darfur and are cultivating the land. In some places they are keeping the people in virtual slavery, preventing them from leaving and regularly assaulting women. Elsewhere they beat up displaced persons who try to return to their own village in order to cultivate their land and tell them to stay away and never to come back, if they don’t want to be killed.
A sixth wave of violence consists of increased banditry. Around El Geneina in West Darfur, between Nyala and El Fashr and in quite a few other areas in all three Darfurs bandits are looting and killing. Attacks on convoys have grown increasingly brazen. Together with the clashes between the parties this has resulted in stalling a considerable part of our humanitarian operations. These operations are also affected by polarization in the camps. Groups against the DPA oppose those who are in favour. In a number of camps this is resulting in tribal fights, in particular between Fur and Zaghawa. In the camps there are plenty of weapons. They are used to deter possible attackers - Janjaweed are still roaming around camps and continue to harass and rape women and girls - , but also to raid cattle, risking retaliation. In the camps law and order gradually dissolve. Elder traditional leaders are losing their authority. Youth groups are becoming more and more violent. The environment is rife with rumors. Recently humanitarian workers were accused of poisoning drinking water, food and even plastic sheeting and of spying for the Government. In July six Sudanese staff members working for aid agencies were killed.
Aid agencies, in particular non-governmental organisations, are vulnerable. Cars are hijacked, drivers are killed. So far, UN agencies have not been attacked in Darfur. However, the African Union is under attack. In the first seven months of 2006 the number of security incidents affecting the NGO’s increased with 75% in comparison with the first seven months of last year. Violent activities targeting the African Union increased even more: with 900%! Not only bandits, youth gangs and militia have clashed with AMIS military and police units, but also rebel SLA troops, accusing AMIS of partiality.
Three months after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement the picture is bleak. Nobody expected that security would be restored at once. But presently the situation is worse than in the last three months before the signing of the agreement and it is deteriorating. There is fragmentation of parties. There is complete denial of ceasefire violations as well as of human rights violations. They are not addressed, let alone sanctioned. The agreement was meant to cement the parties together, but it has become a source of further disruption.
The solution of this crisis should be found, first, by enforcing the implementation of what has been agreed, rather than allowing the Government and the Minawi faction to disregard their commitments. Second, by getting all parties on board (instead of alienating dissenters and attacking non-signatories) and inviting them to participate in all inclusive Darfurian institutions, whether they have signed the agreement or not (yet). Third, by starting an all inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue as soon as possible and by linking this dialogue with reconstruction, return and reconciliation programmes, irrespective of the political stance of the groups concerned. Last but not least, by establishing a robust international peace force, capable to deter and contain old and new assailants, Janjaweed as well as NRF, bandits as well as warlords. The DPA is more than a security arrangement. However, without an improving security situation all other elements of the DPA are bound to fail.