Weblog nr 5
December 18, 2005

The seventh round of the Abuja talks started earlier this month. I was present during the opening session and became a bit more optimistic. Our Nigerian host, Minister Adeneji of Foreign Affairs, brought the message from President Obasanjo that we were welcome again, but that he invited us to visit other places in his country: “Make this the last round and come back as tourists or otherwise”. All speakers committed themselves to do their utmost to finalise the talks before the end of this year. This promise was made also by the Government of Sudan and by the rebel movements. The latter had defined a common platform: one common negotiation team for the two wings of the SLM and close cooperation with the other movement, the JEM, in order to reach a common position on the substantive agenda items. Pressure by the international partners, notably the USA, Libya, Chad and Eritrea - an interesting coalition - had turned out to be successful in a last preparatory meeting in D'Jamena. Abdul Wahid and Minnie Minawi could not agree who should speak on behalf of the SLM - neither wanted the other to take the floor, in order to prevent legitimation - but a way out was found by letting JEM speak on behalf of all. It was a pragmatic solution, revealing a certain flexibility of the two adversaries who hitherto had been uncompromising. However, it meant also a weakening of SLM in relation to JEM.

I had to return to Khartoum. When I came back to Abuja a week later some progress had been made in the talks. That was not yet the case for the important agenda item concerning wealth sharing. The war started because of feelings of utter neglect of the people of Darfur by the regime in Khartoum. Of years budgetary allocations for the social and economic development of Darfur had been brought back to approximately nil. In order to address the causes of the war questions concerning income and wealth should figure prominently on the agenda of the talks. Constructive preparatory workshops have been held. But there is still a lot to do: what about land and water resources? What about oil? How much money will the government make available for Darfur? What about foreign aid? For South Sudan a joint effort has been made (Government, SPLM, donors) to design a common development program and to fund this together. Can something similar be organised for the development of Darfur? Whose development? And who is going to take the decisions?

The last questions provides a link between the chapter on wealth sharing with the second chapter: “sharing of power”. Here some progress had been made in the talks so far. However, it became clear that the relative stronger position of the JEM had resulted in a sharper focus of the movements on questions of power in Khartoum than in Darfur itself. Whether or not Khartoum remains the sole national capital, or whether or not the function of Vice-President of Sudan, next to Salve Kiir and Taha, will be reserved for a Darfurian - two questions raised in particular by the JEM -, does not have a direct impact on the lot of the people of Darfur themselves. Neither does a dispute about the frontiers of Darfur. To decide on Darfur as a region, a superstructure of the three states North, South and West Darfur, a strong claim by the movements, is only relevant if more democratic decision making within the new region will be ensured. That requires a focus on internal Darfurian issues: elections, a council, the allocation of power between legislative, executive and judiciary authorities, tribal relations, democratisation, human rights, reconciliation, etcetera. The discussions about these issues have hardly started. The peace talks in Abuja should not be expected to go into details about such issues. These should be reserved for the Darfur-Darfur dialogue that could start after the peace talks and include many other parties, such as tribes that so far have not taken side in the war and civil society. However, some broad framework should be agreed upon between the belligerent parties, in order to ensure that the fighting stops. A guaranteed and permanent ceasefire is the minimum one should achieve in the Abuja talks. Otherwise the Darfur-Darfur dialogue would risk an early breakdown due to a renewed outbreak of the fights.

This brings me to the third chapter of the agenda: security. Strangely enough as yet this subject has hardly been touched. It is also worth noticing that, in so far as security issues were discussed, it is again the JEM that calls the tune. The JEM is much smaller and weaker on the ground than the SLM. Its ground force is estimated to be less than 2,000 combatants, against over 30,000 in SLM. Minnie Minawi has claimed to give the highest priority to security issues on the agenda, before power and wealth sharing. How serious is such a claim in the light of the relative strengths of the movements?

Some negotiators and observers expect that the causes of the war should be addressed and solved first. In their view security can wait. The parties, having solved the main issues, would then be less inclined to continue fighting, so that the security issue will solve itself. There is some logic in this reasoning. However, the North-South peace talks in Nairobi, which resulted in a peace agreement at the end of 2004, could only get of the ground after a well observed cease fire had been reached. One could expect something similar in Darfur. Moreover, presently most victims result from attacks by parties that are not represented at the negotiation table in Abuja: Arab militia, Janjaweed fighters and recent new or split off rebel movements. By now it is clear that neither the SLM nor the Government is willing or able to stop these movements, let alone disarm them. Also for that reason it is highly necessary to reach an agreement with regard to security issues soon. This would enable either party to face these movements without being thwarted by the other. It would also open the door for a joint approach, such as in the South, where Joint Integrated Units are being formed, consisting of combatants of both the army and the SPLA.

This requires that the talks concerning violations of the fragile ceasefire reached in D'Jamena in May 2004 should be followed up by negotiations, here in Abuja, concerning future security arrangements. Important questions which will have to be addressed include the transparency of troop locations and troop movements; their monitoring by impartial military observers; the possibility of cantonment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants; the protection of displaced people in and around the camps as well as of returning refugees; the undoing of the occupation of villages whose inhabitants had been killed or chased away and the protection of villages against new attacks by militia that try to cleanse whole areas. Last but not least, parties will have decide to which extent all this should be guaranteed with the help of a robust and effective force from outside.

In my view this is crucial. After all the killings the people of Darfur will never thrust the Sudanese army or its police. In the future a new generation may again gain confidence in the institutions of the Sudanese state, but the present generation needs a protection guarantee from abroad. If not, violence will continue, from both sides. Whatever the outcome of the talks in Abuja may be, a cease fire and a peace agreement will only hold in combination with effective and lasting international protection.

Will it be possible to agree on a framework peace agreement answering all the questions mentioned above before the end of this year? That was the objective. In the opening session of this last round of the talks parties committed themselves towards this end. However, so much still has to be done that I am afraid that they will not succeed. The worst is that the closer parties approach the finish, the more they seem to loose their sense of urgency.