Weblog nr 12
February 12, 2006
Looking back at the first year after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan we can say that the peace process is on track. That is what I said in my address to the Security Council, last month in New York. It is on course, slow, but forward, without backtracking. The leaders in the North and in the South are determined to keep the peace, if only because they know that their fate and that of their country depends on the determination to keep the peace. Once enemies, they know depend on each other, bound to work together.
Is this true? A week ago Salve Kiir, President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Vice-President of the Sudan, leader of the SPLM, held a press conference in which he publicly criticized his Northern partners in the peace process, the National Congress Party. The status of the special area Abyei has not been settled. The agreed 50% of the oil proceeds has not been paid. A number of institutions officially established on the basis of the CPA is not functioning. Kiir used unexpectedly harsh language. His statements were answered by Northern politicians claiming that the money had been transferred and suggesting that expenditures in the South were not transparent. The political atmosphere has deteriorated.
Why has Kiir chosen to go public? So far he had followed a different approach, moderate in public but tough behind the screens, in meetings with his colleague politicians in Khartoum, including President Beshir. But he had lost a couple of political disputes and was increasingly criticized by his own constituency in the South. He had to go public, in order not to alienate himself from his people.
During my discussions in Juba with Southern politicians, including Kiir, his Vice-President Riek Machar and key SPLM leaders such as John Luk and Justin Yac. I got the impression that the gap between North and South is widening. The honeymoon is over. Southern leaders see themselves first and foremost as Southerners, hardly as coalition partners in the Government of National Unity. They cannot identify themselves with this Government, of which they themselves are full members. In Khartoum I had noted that the Southern members of this Government had not much influence. Their position in the Government had been weakened by the appointment of a Council of Presidential Advisers, not accountable to anyone than the Presidency itself. Their position within their own ministry had been weakened by the appointment of State Ministers and Deputy Ministers belonging to the NCP. The bureaucracy clearly showed a greater loyalty to the latter than to the SPLM ministers. The SPLM has not done much to keep a close contact with its own ministers. Some of them have reacted by becoming overly loyal to their coalition party, the NCP, thereby distancing themselves even further from the rank and file in the South.
To a certain extent this is a normal political and bureaucratic process, not unlike coalition politics in other countries. However, in the Sudan the situation is different. Sudan is not being ruled by a normal coalition government, but by a Government of National Unity which in 2011 will have to face a referendum about this very unity. It is a coalition government in a country of 'two systems, one nation', in the terminology used by the late John Garang. Any divide now, if not properly addressed, will five years from now inevitably lead to separation instead of unity.
Photo: Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg (c)
In my speech to the Security Council on 15 January this year I expressed the fear that the confidence gap was growing. I gave some examples and called for a common approach to avoid further mutual suspicion. I am afraid that the leaders are not inclined to do so. In the South many do not seem to believe anymore that unity is an option for ever. They are not yet campaigning for separation, but they seem to have made up their mind. They are angry about what they perceive as the policy of Khartoum to undermine the position of the SPLM and the Southern Government. An example is their accusation that Khartoum is still supporting operations of the Lord Resistance Army, a rebel movement originating from Uganda, in Southern Sudan. However, they express their anger in a rather fatalistic way: “Khartoum will never change”. Political opportunities which do exist to catalyze such a change are often missed. I cannot avoid the impression that some Southern leaders do not even try to grasp such opportunities, but seek and cherish excuses to campaign for separation later.
The Northern leaders, for their part, seem to believe that the Southern leaders have already made up their mind and that it would be useless to try to accommodate them in order to change their opinion. They too turn inwards rather than intensify the cooperation. This results in slowing down the pace of implementation of the CPA and in frustrating the formation of the Joint Integrated units of both armies, a cornerstone of the peace agreement.
I fear that the mutual distrust will become a self fulfilling prophecy. Separation six years after the signing of the peace agreement may become unavoidable. However, although a referendum resulting in a majority vote for separation would be legitimate, it would be disastrous. The UN would have to guarantee that such a majority vote would be respected. That would be sheer impossible. I am convinced that separation would lead to war. Many in the North would go to war in order to keep the South part of Sudan. The Southern minority living within the North would become a target and the Northern minority in the South likewise. The border between the North and the Sourth would be disputed. Fights would start in order to occupy the oil fields. In the transitional areas (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile) civil wars would erupt.
Last week I visited Blue Nile State, one of these transitional areas. The Northern, more Arabic, part of Blue Nile is a world of difference with the extremely poor Southern, more African, part of Blue Nile. The two main towns, Damazin in the North and Kurmuk in the South, seem to lie in two different countries. But it was remarkable to see how SPLM leaders could cooperate with NCP politicians. It gave me new hope. The gap can be bridged. But we need time and trust. Both are scarce.
Is this true? A week ago Salve Kiir, President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Vice-President of the Sudan, leader of the SPLM, held a press conference in which he publicly criticized his Northern partners in the peace process, the National Congress Party. The status of the special area Abyei has not been settled. The agreed 50% of the oil proceeds has not been paid. A number of institutions officially established on the basis of the CPA is not functioning. Kiir used unexpectedly harsh language. His statements were answered by Northern politicians claiming that the money had been transferred and suggesting that expenditures in the South were not transparent. The political atmosphere has deteriorated.
Why has Kiir chosen to go public? So far he had followed a different approach, moderate in public but tough behind the screens, in meetings with his colleague politicians in Khartoum, including President Beshir. But he had lost a couple of political disputes and was increasingly criticized by his own constituency in the South. He had to go public, in order not to alienate himself from his people.
During my discussions in Juba with Southern politicians, including Kiir, his Vice-President Riek Machar and key SPLM leaders such as John Luk and Justin Yac. I got the impression that the gap between North and South is widening. The honeymoon is over. Southern leaders see themselves first and foremost as Southerners, hardly as coalition partners in the Government of National Unity. They cannot identify themselves with this Government, of which they themselves are full members. In Khartoum I had noted that the Southern members of this Government had not much influence. Their position in the Government had been weakened by the appointment of a Council of Presidential Advisers, not accountable to anyone than the Presidency itself. Their position within their own ministry had been weakened by the appointment of State Ministers and Deputy Ministers belonging to the NCP. The bureaucracy clearly showed a greater loyalty to the latter than to the SPLM ministers. The SPLM has not done much to keep a close contact with its own ministers. Some of them have reacted by becoming overly loyal to their coalition party, the NCP, thereby distancing themselves even further from the rank and file in the South.
To a certain extent this is a normal political and bureaucratic process, not unlike coalition politics in other countries. However, in the Sudan the situation is different. Sudan is not being ruled by a normal coalition government, but by a Government of National Unity which in 2011 will have to face a referendum about this very unity. It is a coalition government in a country of 'two systems, one nation', in the terminology used by the late John Garang. Any divide now, if not properly addressed, will five years from now inevitably lead to separation instead of unity.
A family in front of their home in Juba
Photo: Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg (c)
In my speech to the Security Council on 15 January this year I expressed the fear that the confidence gap was growing. I gave some examples and called for a common approach to avoid further mutual suspicion. I am afraid that the leaders are not inclined to do so. In the South many do not seem to believe anymore that unity is an option for ever. They are not yet campaigning for separation, but they seem to have made up their mind. They are angry about what they perceive as the policy of Khartoum to undermine the position of the SPLM and the Southern Government. An example is their accusation that Khartoum is still supporting operations of the Lord Resistance Army, a rebel movement originating from Uganda, in Southern Sudan. However, they express their anger in a rather fatalistic way: “Khartoum will never change”. Political opportunities which do exist to catalyze such a change are often missed. I cannot avoid the impression that some Southern leaders do not even try to grasp such opportunities, but seek and cherish excuses to campaign for separation later.
The Northern leaders, for their part, seem to believe that the Southern leaders have already made up their mind and that it would be useless to try to accommodate them in order to change their opinion. They too turn inwards rather than intensify the cooperation. This results in slowing down the pace of implementation of the CPA and in frustrating the formation of the Joint Integrated units of both armies, a cornerstone of the peace agreement.
I fear that the mutual distrust will become a self fulfilling prophecy. Separation six years after the signing of the peace agreement may become unavoidable. However, although a referendum resulting in a majority vote for separation would be legitimate, it would be disastrous. The UN would have to guarantee that such a majority vote would be respected. That would be sheer impossible. I am convinced that separation would lead to war. Many in the North would go to war in order to keep the South part of Sudan. The Southern minority living within the North would become a target and the Northern minority in the South likewise. The border between the North and the Sourth would be disputed. Fights would start in order to occupy the oil fields. In the transitional areas (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile) civil wars would erupt.
Last week I visited Blue Nile State, one of these transitional areas. The Northern, more Arabic, part of Blue Nile is a world of difference with the extremely poor Southern, more African, part of Blue Nile. The two main towns, Damazin in the North and Kurmuk in the South, seem to lie in two different countries. But it was remarkable to see how SPLM leaders could cooperate with NCP politicians. It gave me new hope. The gap can be bridged. But we need time and trust. Both are scarce.