Weblog nr 14
February 24, 2006
After my visit to Damazin and Kurmuk, in Blue Nile State, earlier this month (see weblog nr 12), I paid a visit to Upper Nile State and Unity State. Blue Nile state is a so-called “Other Area”, which means that it has a special status, neither belonging to the North, nor to the South. Two other areas have a similar status: Abyei and South Kordofan, internationally well known as the Nuba Mountains. The composition of the population of these states, each situated somewhere between the North and the South, is more mixed than that of the others. A referendum in the South will not have the same consequences as for the Southern states. The political problems in these states are more complicated, partly due to the specific composition of the population, partly due to specific roots of the war in these areas, but also because of economic reasons. Oil, land and water play a major role in these states.
Photo: Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg (c)
Damazin is more Arabic, less poor, strongly dominated by the National Congress Party, though the cooperation with the SPLM has developed remarkably well since the signing of the peace agreement. Kurmuk is more African, utterly poor, strongly SPLM. I was struck by the sense of cooperation on the ground. It seems as if there is a greater willingness to cooperate in the region than at the national level. That is reassuring, but fragile. A widening divide at the national level would give a negative impulse to the peace spirit at the grassroots.
Such a negative impulse can result from various different decisions. In earlier weblogs I referred to the dispute concerning the allocation of oil revenue to the region. Where is the money? Still in Khartoum, or has it been put on unknown accounts? Who decides what amounts to 50% (the Southern share of the revenue of oil production on its territory) of what? Where exactly does the oil production take place, or, in other words: where exactly is the border between North and South? What is the accounting price per barrel of oil? These and other questions are raised time and again, at high level between the parties that have signed the CPA and at the level of the administrations in the various states who want to spend the money to pay salaries, buy the equipment necessary to run their departments, rehabilitate schools and clinics and invest in economic development. The people are waiting. They are getting frustrated and become suspicious. Khartoum accuses Juba not being able to run a government and Juba accuses Khartoum deliberately undermining the authority of the new state.
Another negative impulse is the slow withdrawal of the Sudanese (Northern) Armed Forces (SAF) from the territory of Southern Sudan. Within one year after the signing of the peace agreement, on 9 January 2006, 31% of the SAF should have been redeployed behind the border between the two territories (the famous line of I January 1956, the day that Sudan gained its independence). The UN has the task to verify this. That is a difficult task, because one year ago we were not yet allowed by John Garang to deploy our monitors in order to verify the benchmark. If you do not know how big the forces were at the benchmark date, and where they were located in which composition, it is sheer impossible to certify that the necessary reduction has taken place. Yet I was able to inform the Security Council that the target had been reached. I could do so, because both parties had provided data and neither party had disputed the data of the other party. However, in the meantime SPLA seems to have second thoughts. On the ground there are many complaints that in reality he SAF has not withdrawn, or withdrawn and returned thereafter.
I found an example in Unity State. Officials complained that the SAF had returned to safeguard oil fields on the territory of Unity State. The neighbor state South Kordofan claims that these oil field are part of its territory. The border dispute has not yet been solved. By sending the SAF to protect the fields the Khartoum seems to use its power to claim the oil production as its own, which means that the South would be deprived of its share of 50%.
A third problem is the integration of the forces of the so-called Other Armed Groups into the SPLM. These forces had fought as an alternative rebel movement in the South. Sometimes they had fought against the SAF. Sometimes they had changed alliances and fought together with the SAF against the SPLM. There were quite a few of them, often of a specific regional or tribal nature. Together they had formed a conglomerate, the Southern Sudanese Defense Force, SSDF. The SSDF had not participated in the Nairobi peace talks between the North and the South. The SPLM had excluded them, understandably, because many of the SSDF forces had been supported by Khartoum. The Sudanese government has always been a master in the game of divide and rule and has always tried to let others do the dirty work.
In Nairobi it was agreed that the SSDF should make the choice, either to be integrated into the SPLM or into SAF, within the period of one year after the signing of the CPA, so, before 9 January 2006. Talks had started between SPLM and SSDF, but they had been difficult, because the relation between John Garang and the leadership of the SSDF had been tense. After the death of Garang Salve Kiir had made some overtures. This resulted in an agreement one day before the deadline, on 8 January this year: the Juba Declaration between Salve Kiir and Paulino Matip, the leader of the SSDF.
NCP leaders in Khartoum were surprised. I found that strange, because objective spectators had always expected that ultimately SSDF would choose in favor of the South. Clearly Khartoum had thought that they could always continue a policy of manipulation and bribery. Earlier this year I had asked Paulino Matip how many of his commanders would follow him. He had been cautious: about 40% had done this right away, others would follow after further discussions. However, he feared that the SAF would try to undermine the agreement by inciting violence. He was afraid that quite a few would either be threatened or bought.
In Bentiu I had a discussion with a number of SSDF commanders who, after some hesitation, had decided to join SPLM. They returned to “the mother”, they said. They tried to make it look self-evident: “we have always been SPLM”, some of them claimed. It was not so credible, in the light of their earlier alliance with the SAF. Was it a political alliance or had they only been acting as mercenaries? I urged them to stick to their position. They promised, but it is no secret that the forces within the SAF and within Military Intelligence and National Security will not hesitate to frustrate the process of integration.
Since the Juba declaration in some parts of the South violent clashes have taken place between SSDF and SPLM military. We have been able to contain them, responding alertly and sending UN military observers and mediators. However, such successes will only be sustainable if the leaders of the North and the South cooperate with each other in order to prevent the repetition of the negative impulses.
A village in the Nuba Mountains
Photo: Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg (c)
Damazin is more Arabic, less poor, strongly dominated by the National Congress Party, though the cooperation with the SPLM has developed remarkably well since the signing of the peace agreement. Kurmuk is more African, utterly poor, strongly SPLM. I was struck by the sense of cooperation on the ground. It seems as if there is a greater willingness to cooperate in the region than at the national level. That is reassuring, but fragile. A widening divide at the national level would give a negative impulse to the peace spirit at the grassroots.
Such a negative impulse can result from various different decisions. In earlier weblogs I referred to the dispute concerning the allocation of oil revenue to the region. Where is the money? Still in Khartoum, or has it been put on unknown accounts? Who decides what amounts to 50% (the Southern share of the revenue of oil production on its territory) of what? Where exactly does the oil production take place, or, in other words: where exactly is the border between North and South? What is the accounting price per barrel of oil? These and other questions are raised time and again, at high level between the parties that have signed the CPA and at the level of the administrations in the various states who want to spend the money to pay salaries, buy the equipment necessary to run their departments, rehabilitate schools and clinics and invest in economic development. The people are waiting. They are getting frustrated and become suspicious. Khartoum accuses Juba not being able to run a government and Juba accuses Khartoum deliberately undermining the authority of the new state.
Another negative impulse is the slow withdrawal of the Sudanese (Northern) Armed Forces (SAF) from the territory of Southern Sudan. Within one year after the signing of the peace agreement, on 9 January 2006, 31% of the SAF should have been redeployed behind the border between the two territories (the famous line of I January 1956, the day that Sudan gained its independence). The UN has the task to verify this. That is a difficult task, because one year ago we were not yet allowed by John Garang to deploy our monitors in order to verify the benchmark. If you do not know how big the forces were at the benchmark date, and where they were located in which composition, it is sheer impossible to certify that the necessary reduction has taken place. Yet I was able to inform the Security Council that the target had been reached. I could do so, because both parties had provided data and neither party had disputed the data of the other party. However, in the meantime SPLA seems to have second thoughts. On the ground there are many complaints that in reality he SAF has not withdrawn, or withdrawn and returned thereafter.
I found an example in Unity State. Officials complained that the SAF had returned to safeguard oil fields on the territory of Unity State. The neighbor state South Kordofan claims that these oil field are part of its territory. The border dispute has not yet been solved. By sending the SAF to protect the fields the Khartoum seems to use its power to claim the oil production as its own, which means that the South would be deprived of its share of 50%.
A third problem is the integration of the forces of the so-called Other Armed Groups into the SPLM. These forces had fought as an alternative rebel movement in the South. Sometimes they had fought against the SAF. Sometimes they had changed alliances and fought together with the SAF against the SPLM. There were quite a few of them, often of a specific regional or tribal nature. Together they had formed a conglomerate, the Southern Sudanese Defense Force, SSDF. The SSDF had not participated in the Nairobi peace talks between the North and the South. The SPLM had excluded them, understandably, because many of the SSDF forces had been supported by Khartoum. The Sudanese government has always been a master in the game of divide and rule and has always tried to let others do the dirty work.
In Nairobi it was agreed that the SSDF should make the choice, either to be integrated into the SPLM or into SAF, within the period of one year after the signing of the CPA, so, before 9 January 2006. Talks had started between SPLM and SSDF, but they had been difficult, because the relation between John Garang and the leadership of the SSDF had been tense. After the death of Garang Salve Kiir had made some overtures. This resulted in an agreement one day before the deadline, on 8 January this year: the Juba Declaration between Salve Kiir and Paulino Matip, the leader of the SSDF.
NCP leaders in Khartoum were surprised. I found that strange, because objective spectators had always expected that ultimately SSDF would choose in favor of the South. Clearly Khartoum had thought that they could always continue a policy of manipulation and bribery. Earlier this year I had asked Paulino Matip how many of his commanders would follow him. He had been cautious: about 40% had done this right away, others would follow after further discussions. However, he feared that the SAF would try to undermine the agreement by inciting violence. He was afraid that quite a few would either be threatened or bought.
In Bentiu I had a discussion with a number of SSDF commanders who, after some hesitation, had decided to join SPLM. They returned to “the mother”, they said. They tried to make it look self-evident: “we have always been SPLM”, some of them claimed. It was not so credible, in the light of their earlier alliance with the SAF. Was it a political alliance or had they only been acting as mercenaries? I urged them to stick to their position. They promised, but it is no secret that the forces within the SAF and within Military Intelligence and National Security will not hesitate to frustrate the process of integration.
Since the Juba declaration in some parts of the South violent clashes have taken place between SSDF and SPLM military. We have been able to contain them, responding alertly and sending UN military observers and mediators. However, such successes will only be sustainable if the leaders of the North and the South cooperate with each other in order to prevent the repetition of the negative impulses.