Weblog nr 24
June 11, 2006

Darfur enjoys much international attention, so much that North–South issues in Sudan tend to be neglected. It is nearly one year ago that the Government of National Unity was established, comprised of the (Northern) National Congress Party and the (Southern) Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement. Have they been able to make the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) more sustainable and inclusive? Many people doubt that this has been the case. There is still much distrust at the grassroots. It cannot be denied that the peace process is slowing down. Quite a few of the institutions which had provided for in the peace agreement hardly function. Amongst them the oil commission, the commission which has to demarcate the border between North and South and the commission that should deal with the incorporation of the so-called Other Armed Groups into the regular armies of North and South are the most prominent. As yet no decision has been taken about the borders, the citizenship and the governmental regime of Abyei, one of the three areas (the other are South Kordofan and Blue Nile State) with a special status. The formation of the Joint Integrated Units of the armies of North and South has not yet started. In the South there is increasing suspicion that Khartoum is riding rough-shod over the agreement and even undermines the peace process.

Two weeks ago the two political parties held a joint conference in Khartoum to bridge the confidence gap and to iron out their differences with regard to the implementation of the CPA. Both President Bashir and Vice-President Kiir spoke at the official opening. Kiir was quite specific and mentioned his priorities: implementation of the report of the Abyei Boundaries (arbitration) Commission of June last year; redeployment of the (Northern) Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) from the South; demarcation of the 1956 borders between the North and the South; formation of the joint integrated units of both armies; bringing the still prevailing laws (such as the national security laws) in accordance with the new Constitution; and ending SAF support to armed rebel groups still operating in the South. He warned that the spirit of partnership would diminish and hostilities would erupt if agreements would not be honored.

The discussions were heated. At the end of the conference both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the CPA and their pledge never to return to war. However, they did not reach consensus on any of the main issues. Most of the contentious issues were referred back to the Presidency for decision. That formula had been chosen earlier, in particular with regard to those issues that could not be agreed upon when the peace talks in Nairobi drew near to the deadline of 31 December 2004. However, gradually the agenda of the Presidency takes after the Bermuda triangle: once an issue is put there, it stays and the solution passes from sight.

As a matter of fact that is in particular true for the dispute concerning Abyei. The conference again referred the matter back to the Presidency, this time to consider four options: reaching a political agreement; calling on the experts who had written the report to clarify their recommendations; referring the matter to the Constitutional Court; or seeking arbitration by a third party. This makes sense. As a matter of facts we had proposed some of these options already a year ago. But to no avail. There is no reason to expect that presently the parties are more amenable to either of these options. On the contrary. Rumor has it that the President is not prepared to move one inch, while the Vice-President would have declared that “without implementation there is no agreement and without agreement there is no peace”.

For both of them it will be difficult to move. The respective Misherya and Dinka constituencies seem to be determined not to compromise. They are quite vocal. There were demonstrations during the parties’ conference and also during the visit of a delegation of the UN Security Council, last week. The Council members were told in unmistakable terms by members of the parliament in Juba that for them Abyei was the major yardstick for the sincerity of Khartoum.
So far the dispute has not resulted in violent clashes, neither between the parties nor between the tribes. There were threats, but UN peace keeping efforts have resulted in a containment of the dispute on the ground. Time will bring counsel, we thought a year ago. It did not and presently we keep our fingers crossed. Parties should understand that they should not bend the bow till it breaks.

In other parts of Southern Sudan violence is increasing. There are conflicts between nomads and settlers, between cattle raiders and herders, between shepherds and farmers, between returnees and the local population. Disgruntled soldiers, for long not having been paid, start looting. Crime is on the rise. Some Other Armed Groups, not having been part of the SPLA, but loosely associated with the former rival liberation movement SSDF, refuse to follow their leader Paulino Matiep, who has decided to join the SPLA. Instead they continue fighting. In Jonglei a civilian militia, the White Army, refuses to lay down arms. People living around the oil fields are being harassed or even evicted from their land. In many Southern states tribal conflicts explode into violent clashes. In the deep South the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is attacking villages.

Many people believe that these clashes are fed by arms and ammunition delivered by the government in Khartoum, or at least by powerful Northern forces who still do not accept the relative autonomy of the South. This is not only the conviction of common people in the South, but also of leading politicians openly accusing the government in Khartoum of undermining the peace process. Kiir said so in his opening speech to the NCP/SPLM conference. Parliamentarians referred to this in the discussion with the Security Council delegation. In the official Cease Fire Joint Military Commission the SPLA accuses SAF of continued support to the LRA and the Other Armed Groups. Paulino Matiep told me that in his view the conflict in Jonglei was neither tribal (between the Dinka and the Nuer Lou), neither a battle for resources, nor a reaction to the forced disarmament campaign launched by the government in Juba, but the result of government sponsored actions by Gordon Kong and other commanders of Other Armed Groups.

It is difficult to ascertain the truth. The Khartoum government denies the accusations, of course. They say that in the past such support had been given during the civil war against the SPLA, but that after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement there is no reason whatsoever to continue this. They claim that instructions to the contrary have been given, but admit that they cannot guarantee that every military or para-military commander is obeying these instructions. So, accusations continue and the suspicion increases.

Our role as peace keepers is to mediate, build confidence, contain the conflicts and prevent that they escalate into violent clashes, which reproduce themselves. In Southern Sudan we have been relatively successful, using all the resources we have: military (a peace keeping force of 10.000 men and women), police, civilian, humanitarian, our political good offices and some reconciliation and reconstruction assistance. But it is tight.

Chances are that we will get a second peace keeping task in Darfur. Presently we are preparing ourselves for this challenge. It could very well be more difficult than the task in the South. In Darfur there at least as many other armed groups as in the South and the Darfur Peace Agreement is more disputed than the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South. But whoever might think that we could build a peace keeping force in Darfur by cannibalizing the forces in the South and redeploying some of these towards another part of Sudan would be mistaken. Robbing Peter to pay Paul is no solution. In the South we need all the forces we have, because peace is yet far from sustained.