Weblog nr 25
June 19, 2006

How to approach the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)? The movement has made many, many victims during a period of more than twenty years. It has its base in north Uganda, fighting against the Ugandan Defense Force (UDF).. LRA combatants, led by Joseph Kony and Vincent Otty, are responsible for bestial cruelties against the people of North Uganda. Kony claimed to be inspired by the Lord and got the aura of an invincible. His followers are believers, in him. He has been ruthless towards dissidents. No wonder that in October last year, the International Criminal Court, issued an indictment against Kony and Otti and three of their commanders for crimes against humanity. At last.

As a matter of fact the indictment had taken place several months earlier, in July. In October the warrants were unsealed and transmitted to the governments of Uganda and Sudan. All signatories to the ICC have the obligation to cooperate on the execution of the warrants. The unsealing of the warrants took place the week after I had pleaded, during an informal session of the UN Security Council, to try to find a political solution for the conflict in North Uganda. Since a decade the LRA had also fought in Sudan, first only to seek refuge, later also with the support of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the SPLA. Now that a peace agreement had been reached between North and South Sudan there was no reason anymore for President Beshir to continue to support the LRA. In Juba a Southern government had been established. This had changed the scenario, I argued. So far, a military solution had not been found. The LRA had not been defeated and there was no reason to assume that this would be possible in the near future. I proposed to try again to find a political solution. The LRA had never developed a political agenda, so that it would be difficult to negotiate. However, in an earlier stage Kony had made clear to Betty Bigombe, a former Ugandese minister who had been tasked with the facilitation of some contacts with the LRA (all by phone), that he did not reject to talk. However, he had expressed the fear that any effort to establish a physical contact would be nothing else than a trap. In my view the new political situation in Southern Sudan warranted a new effort to find a solution through talking. Kony would understand that his support base in Sudan had altered drastically. He might now be more interested in a negotiation, provided that the international community would guarantee his personal safety during the talks. Like in many other situations, justice could be found after the establishment of peace. At the same time the SPLA, in cooperation with the SAF and the UDF, could strengthen their military force to deter the LRA from attacking villages and killing civilians. This might even further Kony’s inclination to negotiate, because other options would become less and less attractive to him.

My proposal fell flat. The Security Council did not react. The indictment by the ICC, one week later, blocked any possible political effort. Authorities and troops of all countries signatories to the ICC are obliged to arrest Kony cs, when and where they find or meet him. Ocampo, the Prosecutor of the ICC, told me that in his view a political solution was out of the question. Previous efforts had failed, any new effort would fail likewise. I felt that it was not the task of the ICC to give a political judgment, but it was Ocampo’s right and duty to use all instruments of international criminal law within his authority against perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Without a shade of doubt Kony is a criminal.

Ocampo had not informed us in advance, let alone consulted us. He was not obliged to do so. On the contrary, the ICC should be able to function without any political influence from outside. But it did create a problem. Kony reacted to the indictment - and to the labeling of the LRA as a terrorist movement by some Western countries - by increasing his attacks in South Sudan. Quite a few villagers were killed and also three international humanitarian workers. We had to declare a large part of Southern Sudan to the south and west of Juba a no go area. Kony brought part of his combatants to neighboring Congo, where they tried to find refuge in the Garamba Park. Over there in a battle with the UN forces in Congo eight UN peacekeepers, all from Guatamala, died.

Is it wise to continue the military option? In Southern Sudan the UN peace keeping force has no mandate to attack them, only to defend itself and civilians in the near vicinity, if attacked by LRA. A number of countries call the LRA a threat to the regional security in Africa, making it an issue of the UN Security Council. They want to give a stronger mandate to the UN to fight the LRA. Our force is presently not equipped for a targeted military operation. It would have to be strengthened. How much? That would depend on the strength of the LRA. How strong is the LRA? We can only guess. Intelligence is poor. The lowest figure I ever heard was 300, the highest 5000. It will be difficult to defeat them. The bush in Southern Sudan provides a sanctuary. Moreover, LRA still seems to get support from unknown Sudanese forces. The SPLM accuses Khartoum to continue delivering arms and ammunition and a hide-out. Khartoum denies this, of course, but military experts have assured me that without outside support LRA would not have been able to remain alive and active.

One of the options which we considered was to weaken the LRA by promoting defection, promising the fighters amnesty and re-integration into the society, if they would lay down their arms. The leaders then could either be taken captive or be persuaded to surrender and brought to The Hague where they be promised a fair trial. This too raised many questions. How to ensure the cooperation of all countries? Who is entitled to promise amnesty to whom? What would be the reaction of the victims of the LRA and their relatives? Would Kony cs prefer the inevitability of a relatively comfortable jail after the trial or would he choose for a relatively uncomfortable freedom in the bush, permanently being hunted?

To our surprise Kony himself took the initiative. Last month he sent his deputy Otti to Juba with the request to the Government of Southern Sudan to facilitate talks with the Government of Uganda. It was his response to an earlier warning issued by President Kiir that the LRA had only three options: to accept mediation, to leave Southern Sudan or to be thrown out. Vice President Riek Machar, authorized by President Kiir, made clear that he wanted to get this request from Kony in person and that the LRA should stop all attacks. Thereupon Kony came himself, with a remarkable plea for peace. The LRA had indeed stopped its attacks. Many attacks had been made in order to loot in order to survive and steal weapons. In order to ensure that no further attacks would take place Riek Machar offered food and 20,000 dollar. That was a mistake. To give food under the condition that no further plunder would take place might perhaps have been accepted by the people in the South, but the picture of Riek Machar handing over a check to a wanted mass criminal has wrecked popular support for this possible road to peace.

President Museveni of Uganda had promised President Kiir that he would be willing to consider mediation. A delegation of the LRA has arrived in Juba. It consists mainly of Northern Ugandese refugees, living in the diaspora in Europe and the USA. Globalization has guaranteed that any rebel movement, wherever fighting, has a diaspora somewhere else in the world, providing financial and political support. However, talks have not yet started. Uganda has set an ultimatum: no attacks until 31 July. However, it is still considering whether to send a delegation. Kampala has announced that it first wants to consult other countries and also the ICC in order to see whether it is possible to meet LRA.

The dilemma is clear. It goes beyond the question whether to prefer a political or a military solution. There are many other questions. What comes first: justice or peace? Which route should be chosen: the right path or a bended track? Can amnesty help to bring an end to impunity? Should we go after all perpetrators of crimes or only after the instigators? How many more victims are we willing to sacrifice in order to achieve a final solution? Who has the right to take such decisions: the people in the region or their not so democratic leaders. Or should it be the international community? These and other questions are not only relevant in our search for a solution for North Uganda and Southern Sudan. They will very soon also haunt the agenda on Darfur.