Weblog nr 21
May 9, 2006
“I am happy, but not satisfied', Salim Salim told me at the end of the Darfur peace negotiations in Abuja. After seven rounds of talks, in a period of one and a half year, we finally got a peace agreement. However, not everybody signed. Surprisingly, the Minnie Minawi faction of the SLM gave its consent, while the Abdul Wahid faction did not. The JEM, not surprisingly, opted out. I do not think the latter ever had the intention to reach an agreement. Abdul Wahid did. However, he did shy away from peace, because he was afraid to confront his constituency. He kept saying that the agreement did not meet the expectations of his people. No wonder, because he had raised these expectations by making promises he could not keep.
Salim Salim had produced a compromise text reflecting the inputs from all parties. It was a serious effort to meet all of them halfway. It was not an ideal solution of the differences between the parties, but it was a workable common denominator. Salim did not present the compromise as a 'take it or leave it' position. Such a text is the opposite of a so-called non-paper, which is often presented at the beginning of a negotiation, and which can be torn into pieces in the process of drafting a final agreement. Salim's text was a 'take it, but not leave it' paper. Parties could improve the text, leaving the basic structure intact and provided that they would agree on the amendments.
The Government quickly declared its willingness to accept Salim's text. Vice President Taha, who finally had come to Abuja, stated that he had a number of difficulties with the text, but that he was willing to put them aside in the interest of peace. It was clever, but it instilled the fear amongst the movements that the text was biased. In our view that was not the case. We told the movements that the international observers, present in Abuja, were backing the compromise presented by the African Union and that the movements should only try to improve the text, rather than replace it by a new one. Salim preferred, in this stage, the process to take its course, rather than leading negotiations on the basis of his text. He did not see room for changes to be proposed by himself as mediator. However, the process got stalemated, because parties did not take the initiative to start talking with each other. When finally the African Union took the lead again, the movements came back with long shopping lists, which in fact were a replica of their initial positions. The team of the JEM and that of Minnie Minawi rejected the text outright. Abdul Wahid's team was more reasonable and said that it could negotiate further.
Salim extended the deadline with a couple of days. Some partner countries sent high level delegations in order to help breaking the deadlock: Assistant Secretary of State Zoellick of the US, Minister of Development Cooperation Hillary Wedgwood Benn of the UK, EU Special Envoy Pekka Haavistoo, President Obasanjo of Nigeria, the Chairman of the AU Council Konare and some others. They were able to propose a few amendments making the text more acceptable to the movements, without loosing the consent of the government. I had to leave Abuja in order to participate in a UN meeting in New York which I could not afford to miss, but SG Kofi Annan let me return to Abuja right after the first session. When I arrived in Abuja I could not play a role anymore. The dice had been cast. The Government, now represented by minister Khalifa - of whom many observers had said that as long as he would lead the delegation a compromise would not be possible -, declared that the new text was acceptable. Minnie Minawi said the same. Abdul Wahid, however, took distance from his negotiators and said that the text was unacceptable. Khalil, the leader of the JEM, did the same, using language that insulted President Obasanjo, and left. Obasanjo had chaired the last phase of the talks very charmingly. He decided to organize the signing ceremony right away. We feared that initialing only, to be followed by a signing ceremony later this month, was too risky. Parties might change their mind again ….
That is one of the weaknesses of the agreement: the uncertainty whether it will hold. All partial agreements thus far, following the N'dJamena cease fire agreement of May 2004, had become dead letters. Members of the international community, present in Abuja, co-signed the agreement as witnesses - I did so on behalf of the United Nations -, but did not have the guarantee that parties would keep their word. On the contrary: our co-signing was meant as a kind of guarantee to the parties. By signing we committed ourselves explicitly to participate actively in all institutions to be established by the new peace agreement. This also implied that any violation or non-implementation of the agreement would be noticed and addressed by, for instance, the Security Council of the United Nations.
In a particular stage of the talks Abdul Wahid had asked for guarantees. Perhaps the above was not sufficient in his eyes, though such guarantees - designed in a similar fashion as those concerning the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan - go further than the commitments made by the international community with regard to peace agreements elsewhere in Africa. Maybe Abdul Wahid will come to that conclusion later, after having studied the text of the agreement in more detail. Maybe he will realize that quite a few of his wishes (such as adequate compensation of the victims) could be raised anew in the process of implementation of the agreement, without re-opening the text. Maybe his advisors, his commanders and the tribal leaders in his constituency will put pressure on him to change his position and sign. The African Union has given him until the next meeting of its Peace and Security Council on 15 May to do so.
I am traveling this week to Darfur to speak with all parties concerned, not with their representatives in Abuja, but with commanders, tribal leaders, authorities and representatives of the civil society in order to discuss the significance of the Darfur Peace Agreement. During the last couple of months a disconnect has arisen between the discussions in Abuja and the reality on the ground in Darfur. As a matter of fact, while the atmosphere at the negotiating table improved, the fighting in the field intensified. The gap has to be bridged. One way to do so is to broaden the circle of those who have the courage to accept a compromise rather than continue fighting. War never results in a compromise. It is either victory or defeat. But the people whom the movements claim to represent will always loose, because both victory and defeat will make more victims. Only a compromise, as contained in the Darfur Peace Agreement, will guarantee that the plight of the present victims can be reversed and that no more new victims will be made.
Salim Salim had produced a compromise text reflecting the inputs from all parties. It was a serious effort to meet all of them halfway. It was not an ideal solution of the differences between the parties, but it was a workable common denominator. Salim did not present the compromise as a 'take it or leave it' position. Such a text is the opposite of a so-called non-paper, which is often presented at the beginning of a negotiation, and which can be torn into pieces in the process of drafting a final agreement. Salim's text was a 'take it, but not leave it' paper. Parties could improve the text, leaving the basic structure intact and provided that they would agree on the amendments.
The Government quickly declared its willingness to accept Salim's text. Vice President Taha, who finally had come to Abuja, stated that he had a number of difficulties with the text, but that he was willing to put them aside in the interest of peace. It was clever, but it instilled the fear amongst the movements that the text was biased. In our view that was not the case. We told the movements that the international observers, present in Abuja, were backing the compromise presented by the African Union and that the movements should only try to improve the text, rather than replace it by a new one. Salim preferred, in this stage, the process to take its course, rather than leading negotiations on the basis of his text. He did not see room for changes to be proposed by himself as mediator. However, the process got stalemated, because parties did not take the initiative to start talking with each other. When finally the African Union took the lead again, the movements came back with long shopping lists, which in fact were a replica of their initial positions. The team of the JEM and that of Minnie Minawi rejected the text outright. Abdul Wahid's team was more reasonable and said that it could negotiate further.
Salim extended the deadline with a couple of days. Some partner countries sent high level delegations in order to help breaking the deadlock: Assistant Secretary of State Zoellick of the US, Minister of Development Cooperation Hillary Wedgwood Benn of the UK, EU Special Envoy Pekka Haavistoo, President Obasanjo of Nigeria, the Chairman of the AU Council Konare and some others. They were able to propose a few amendments making the text more acceptable to the movements, without loosing the consent of the government. I had to leave Abuja in order to participate in a UN meeting in New York which I could not afford to miss, but SG Kofi Annan let me return to Abuja right after the first session. When I arrived in Abuja I could not play a role anymore. The dice had been cast. The Government, now represented by minister Khalifa - of whom many observers had said that as long as he would lead the delegation a compromise would not be possible -, declared that the new text was acceptable. Minnie Minawi said the same. Abdul Wahid, however, took distance from his negotiators and said that the text was unacceptable. Khalil, the leader of the JEM, did the same, using language that insulted President Obasanjo, and left. Obasanjo had chaired the last phase of the talks very charmingly. He decided to organize the signing ceremony right away. We feared that initialing only, to be followed by a signing ceremony later this month, was too risky. Parties might change their mind again ….
That is one of the weaknesses of the agreement: the uncertainty whether it will hold. All partial agreements thus far, following the N'dJamena cease fire agreement of May 2004, had become dead letters. Members of the international community, present in Abuja, co-signed the agreement as witnesses - I did so on behalf of the United Nations -, but did not have the guarantee that parties would keep their word. On the contrary: our co-signing was meant as a kind of guarantee to the parties. By signing we committed ourselves explicitly to participate actively in all institutions to be established by the new peace agreement. This also implied that any violation or non-implementation of the agreement would be noticed and addressed by, for instance, the Security Council of the United Nations.
In a particular stage of the talks Abdul Wahid had asked for guarantees. Perhaps the above was not sufficient in his eyes, though such guarantees - designed in a similar fashion as those concerning the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan - go further than the commitments made by the international community with regard to peace agreements elsewhere in Africa. Maybe Abdul Wahid will come to that conclusion later, after having studied the text of the agreement in more detail. Maybe he will realize that quite a few of his wishes (such as adequate compensation of the victims) could be raised anew in the process of implementation of the agreement, without re-opening the text. Maybe his advisors, his commanders and the tribal leaders in his constituency will put pressure on him to change his position and sign. The African Union has given him until the next meeting of its Peace and Security Council on 15 May to do so.
I am traveling this week to Darfur to speak with all parties concerned, not with their representatives in Abuja, but with commanders, tribal leaders, authorities and representatives of the civil society in order to discuss the significance of the Darfur Peace Agreement. During the last couple of months a disconnect has arisen between the discussions in Abuja and the reality on the ground in Darfur. As a matter of fact, while the atmosphere at the negotiating table improved, the fighting in the field intensified. The gap has to be bridged. One way to do so is to broaden the circle of those who have the courage to accept a compromise rather than continue fighting. War never results in a compromise. It is either victory or defeat. But the people whom the movements claim to represent will always loose, because both victory and defeat will make more victims. Only a compromise, as contained in the Darfur Peace Agreement, will guarantee that the plight of the present victims can be reversed and that no more new victims will be made.