Weblog nr 22
May 19, 2006

Will the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed in Abuja earlier this month, hold? It has already been criticized for not meeting the expectations of all parties, in particular those of the Fur, represented by the faction of the SLM led by Abdul Wahid. So far, only one of the rebel movements has signed the agreement - the Minnie Minawi faction of the SLM. It is the strongest one militarily, but it is neither regionally nor tribally representative of the people in Darfur. We had always warned against partial agreements resulting from talks between the government and one of the rebel movements only, leaving others aside. Such a divide and rule tactic had been applied frequently by the government in the war with the South. Recently they followed the same tactic in the conflict with rebel movements in the East and they had not shied away from this practice in their dealings with the parties in Darfur. However, the new Darfur Peace Agreement is not a partial agreement resulting from separate talks. It is the result of the comprehensive and transparent negotiations with all the movements at the same time. At the end some decided to agree, others opted out. It is perfectly defendable to claim that this agreement is a good compromise between the interests of all parties, and that it should not be re-opened.

 

At last the Government seems to be serious. Vice President Taha assured me that the army, the governors and the tribes would be instructed to comply fully with all provisions of the agreement. Since Abuja I went again twice to Darfur and I noticed a change in the attitude of both the authorities and tribal leaders. The people of Darfur want peace and the government seems to understand that there is no other option anymore. Will the Minnie Minawi faction comply? The day after the signing of the agreement there was a rumor in Abuja that his Commander in Chief, Haggar, had declared that he refused to respect the agreement. This was bad news. I decided to visit him in his hotel, together with my colleague Kingibe, the Special Representative of the African Union. We woke him up. He was quite angry: “I have given my word, I have instructed my commanders to observe the agreement and I will stick to it”. In the field his commanders gave me the same message: “We got the message. We still have questions, but Minawi has signed and we will follow.”

 

This is promising. However, there are still many hurdles to be taken. Even if all three movements had joined in the agreement, implementation would have been difficult. Many armed groups will remain active: bandits, rogue commanders and warlords, militia, Janjaweed, Chadian rebels on Sudanese soil. To contain them will be a hell of a job. However, to render the agreement sustainable we must do first things first. It is essential, first, to get support from all parties who, by participating in the talks, had expressed a preference for peace. The circle of supporters and signatories has to be broadened. Without support from the Fur, the major tribe in Darfur, peace is not sustainable.

 

Abdel Wahid, the leader of the other faction of the SLM, refused to sign, though many of his demands were met, at least half way and often more than that. During the last two years Abdul Wahid has hardly been in Sudan itself, always traveling abroad to get support for the movement he started. He is clearly the “symbol” for his people, perhaps even more than before November last year, when his movement split into two factions. This took place in a field conference in Haskenita, in Darfur, initially called for by Wahid, but hijacked by his rival Minawi. Since then the movement is much less multi-tribal than before. The Minawi faction receives its support mainly from the Zaghawa, the Wahid faction mainly from the Fur. On the ground both factions fight each other, a matter of great concern, not only because this weakens the movement as such, but also because these fights have led to human rights violations similar to those by the militia and the Janjaweed. Both factions loathe each other. The leaders do not speak with other. Both factions consider the other as irrelevant or ‘minor’ or ‘junior’ or, worse, illegitimate. After the Haskenita conference they denied each others existence. Presently both accuse the other of having sided with the government or even with the Janjaweed. All this made the talks in Abuja quite cumbersome, and sometimes comical or spooky. Their mutual enmity may even have been the main reason why one faction signed and the other did not. It could have been the other way round ….

 

Yet it is essential that both agree. So, it is crucial to get Abdul Wahid on board, without thereby loosing Minnie Minawi. After the signing of the peace agreement by Minawi Wahid stayed another week in Abuja for talks with the mediators of the African Union. We received some positive signals. Wahid seemed to be willing to add his signature, if some clarifications could be given and attached to the agreement. The AU asked us even not to publish the text of the agreement on the UNMIS website. Some changes might be necessary. Wahid got another chance and the AU decided unilaterally to postpone the date upon which the agreement became operational with a day or ten, despite the fact that this date was part of the agreement itself (the day of signature, May 5). However, in the course of these talks Wahid increased his demands day after day. This meant in fact that the text would have to be re-opened, which was out of the question. So, on May 16 the African Union Peace and Security Council, meeting in Addis Ababa, decided to welcome and confirm the agreement as it stand, inviting Wahid to sign before the end of this month and threatening with sanctions in case he will not comply.

 

I participated in the meeting in Addis. In my statement I emphasized three priorities; broadening the circle of signatories, focusing on implementation of the agreement in order not to let it slip away, and, last but not least, stopping the Janjaweed. The three priorities are interrelated. There is much skepticism around the agreement. Building confidence, in particular amongst those who have not yet signed, requires an end to all violations and attacks.

 

Bringing Abdul Wahid and the Fur aboard requires more than sanctions. In the corridors of Abuja some observers had proposed to consider parties who would not sign as ‘outlaws’. That would be unwise. From all my contacts with his supporters in Khartoum and in Darfur itself I can only conclude: in the present circumstances his people will follow the leader, whether he signs or not, irrespective of the substance of the agreement. This can only be changed by widely giving information about the real content of the agreement. In the last two weeks I have tried to do so in quite a few meetings. In Khartoum I spoke with representatives of the civil society, in the Jebel Mara with his commanders, in camps for displaced people with tribal leaders. Most of them hardly knew what was in the agreement. They had not been told or had been told half truths. To brand them as outlaws would imply that possible bridges towards them would be blown up and that their positions would harden. Outlaws would have to be disciplined with force. I discussed this with Minnie Minawi’s commanders in the field and asked them whether they would concur with putting their former allies in the same category of outlaws as their arch-enemy the Janjaweed. Their answers and body language were clear: “of course not”. “Stop attacking them”, I pleaded. I had made that plea many times. Since Abuja that fighting has diminished.

 

What did not diminish, however, were the attacks by militia and Janjaweed. In the last two weeks in Khor Abeche, Labado and around Kutum many people have been killed. These attacks took place after the agreement. In West Darfur, even in the city El Geneina itself, bandits related with the Janjaweed have become blatantly aggressive, not only towards civilians but also towards the police and the military, governmental as well as African Union military. This was the main question asked by all commanders and all displaced persons alike, irrespective of the rebel faction they felt associated with: “What about the Janjaweed? Will the peace agreement stop them?”     

 

In Abuja that question had never been asked by Abdul Wahid himself. From the beginning he was more interested in questions of power: whether the Darfurians would get a Vice-President in Sudan (a position which he claimed for himself), whether Darfur would become one region or would remain three states, whether Darfurians would get an adequate number of posts in the national government and in the assembly, and whether the SLM would get the majority in Darfur and become stronger than the governmental party, the NCP. These are relevant questions. However, whether or not to contain and disarm the Arab militia and the Janjaweed is for his people a matter of life and death. The people behind Minie Minawi and Abdul Wahid will only believe in the peace agreement if they see that the government and the international community together are serious and successful in stopping the Janjaweed. Then they might press their leaders to reconcile. This also may be the most effective way to bring Abdul Wahid aboard.

 

This cannot be accomplished overnight. I believe that in the meantime it is important to invite the tribal leaders behind Abdul Wahid to participate in the institutions that are to be established on the basis of the peace agreement. They should be able to take part in the Darfur Darfur Dialogue, in the working groups discussing refugee return and village reconstruction and also in the Cease Fire Commission. After all, despite the fact that Abdul Wahid did not yet sign the Abuja peace agreement, he had signed earlier cease fire agreements. He is still bound by his signature and can be taken to task. So, do not exclude, but use carrot and stick.