Weblog nr 23
May 27, 2006
The big question after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement is: will the United Nations decide to send a peace keeping force? There is already such a force sent by the African Union, but this force cannot stay much longer, because of a lack of financial resources. So, in fact the question is: will there be a transition from the present AU peace keeping force towards a UN force?
The Government of Sudan had declared its opposition towards such a transition. I wrote about this in my weblog of 7 April. In March and April President Bashir had said to high officials sent to Sudan by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (first the Under-Secretary General Gambari and later the Deputy Head of the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations, Annabi) that the Sudanese Government and the Parliament were against the transition. For that reason he would even not approve the request of the United Nations to receive a special delegation to review the situation in Darfur, in order to enable Kofi Annan to present an assessment report to the Security Council. The Security Council had demanded such a special assessment report many times, but the Sudanese had taken the position that it was not necessary to assess anything, because a follow up decision to prepare a peace keeping mission to Darfur could only be taken with the consent of the Government and it was not prepared to concur anyway. However, President Beshir had said, once a peace agreement has been signed, the UN may come back for consultations about a possible role of the UN in the implementation of that agreement.
Once the peace agreement had been signed the government initially chose a hard line. In the meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Addis Ababa, 22 May) Minister Lam Akol of Foreign Affairs said that a transition from an AU force towards a UN force was out of the question for three reasons. First, there was no provision for such a transition in the Darfur Peace Agreement. The parties had clearly not found it necessary to have the AU force replaced by a force under the auspices of the UN. Second, those members of the Security Council who always had argued in favor of such a transition and who had been present during the Abuja negotiations - in particular the US and the UK - had never urged to include a provision for a UN force in the text of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Third. Now that there was peace it was no longer necessary to have an international peace force in Darfur. The parties would be able to keep the peace by themselves.
The first argument was not so strong. A transition from an AU to a UN force requires an agreement between the parties to the peace agreement and both the AU and the UN. The fact that there was no provision in the Darfur Peace Agreement was not decisive, though the parties could have agreed to invite the AU and the UN prepare a transition. So, Lam Akol had a point. This was strengthened by his second argument. I have never understood why the international observers present in Abuja refused to put up a reference to a UN force in the agreement, while at the same time in New York and Washington were pressing the UN to prepare itself for the transition. However, by signing the agreement parties are bound to abide all Security Council resolutions concerning Darfur. The preamble of the agreement explicitly says so. That will imply also possible future resolutions concerning a transition.
Would a UN force no longer be necessary now that there is peace? This was Lam Akols third point. It is a rather peculiar argument for a member of a government that has invited the United Nations to come to Sudan and help the parties to the earlier North-South peace agreement to keep that peace. It is even more necessary in Darfur than in South Sudan, because in Darfur there are still many forces that have not acceded to peace.
The African Union Peace and Security Council concluded its deliberations with a decision clearly stating that concrete steps had to be taken to prepare a transition towards a UN force. Until then the AU had only said to support such a transition 'in principle'. The reference to 'concrete steps' could not be misunderstood. In Khartoum the government seemed to understand this. The first reactions were less negative than expected, after having listened to the statement of Minister Lam Akol. However, already one day later the UN Security Council adopted a resolution urging Secretary General Kofi Annan to take such concrete steps. The paragraphs in that resolution were preceded by a reference to Chapter 7 of the Charter, which could be understood as preparing concrete steps towards a peace keeping mission without the consent of the Government of Sudan. It could also be interpreted otherwise. After all, Kofi Annan was only asked to send the assessment mission as soon as possible and to report the findings to the Security Council. Whether or not a peace keeping mission will be sent to Darfur still has to be decided. Moreover, the Security Council resolution was adopted by consensus, including Qatar, China and Russia, countries which are very cautious not to take a decision that would be misunderstood in Khartoum.
However, the Government of Sudan was quite annoyed. They thought that having signed a peace agreement would have given them at least the benefit of the doubt. “Nobody has congratulated us with the peace” was the general complaint amongst the politicians in Khartoum. The resolution, they felt, added insult to injury. This made the mission of Brahimi, Special Envoy of Kofi Annan, sent this week to Khartoum to consult the Government about a possible role for the United Nations in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement very difficult. In the press conference at the end of his visit Brahimi said that the passing of the resolution had been unfortunate. It did certainly not help him. The resolution was premature, because it had been agreed that consultations with the Government of Sudan would have to precede the sending of an assessment mission. However, Brahimi, a former minister of Foreign Affairs of Algiers, and since many years one of the most experienced diplomatic advisors of Kofi Annan, was able to dispel the Sudanese apprehensions. “Do you really believe that I, having fought colonialism in my country and later on elsewhere in Africa, at the end of my career would lend myself to support re-colonisation?”
President Beshir has agreed to the proposal to send an assessment mission to Darfur. That is the result of Brahimi's visit. So, we are one step further. The next steps will have to be taken later on. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mustafa has stated that the phase of confrontation between Sudan and the United Nations is over. “We are now entering the phase of negotiations”. Those negotiations will be difficult. Sudan is clearly of the opinion that the UN can only come under Chapter 6 of the Charter, that means: upon the invitation of the sovereign state Sudan. That would be an operation similar to the one in Southern Sudan. However, the Arab militia, the Janjaweed, the rogue commanders and the rebel movements that have not agreed to peace will require a much more robust mandate. The fact that since the peace agreement has been signed, four weeks ago, militia are still attacking villages and rebel positions, makes this all the more necessary.
The Government of Sudan had declared its opposition towards such a transition. I wrote about this in my weblog of 7 April. In March and April President Bashir had said to high officials sent to Sudan by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (first the Under-Secretary General Gambari and later the Deputy Head of the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations, Annabi) that the Sudanese Government and the Parliament were against the transition. For that reason he would even not approve the request of the United Nations to receive a special delegation to review the situation in Darfur, in order to enable Kofi Annan to present an assessment report to the Security Council. The Security Council had demanded such a special assessment report many times, but the Sudanese had taken the position that it was not necessary to assess anything, because a follow up decision to prepare a peace keeping mission to Darfur could only be taken with the consent of the Government and it was not prepared to concur anyway. However, President Beshir had said, once a peace agreement has been signed, the UN may come back for consultations about a possible role of the UN in the implementation of that agreement.
Once the peace agreement had been signed the government initially chose a hard line. In the meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Addis Ababa, 22 May) Minister Lam Akol of Foreign Affairs said that a transition from an AU force towards a UN force was out of the question for three reasons. First, there was no provision for such a transition in the Darfur Peace Agreement. The parties had clearly not found it necessary to have the AU force replaced by a force under the auspices of the UN. Second, those members of the Security Council who always had argued in favor of such a transition and who had been present during the Abuja negotiations - in particular the US and the UK - had never urged to include a provision for a UN force in the text of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Third. Now that there was peace it was no longer necessary to have an international peace force in Darfur. The parties would be able to keep the peace by themselves.
The first argument was not so strong. A transition from an AU to a UN force requires an agreement between the parties to the peace agreement and both the AU and the UN. The fact that there was no provision in the Darfur Peace Agreement was not decisive, though the parties could have agreed to invite the AU and the UN prepare a transition. So, Lam Akol had a point. This was strengthened by his second argument. I have never understood why the international observers present in Abuja refused to put up a reference to a UN force in the agreement, while at the same time in New York and Washington were pressing the UN to prepare itself for the transition. However, by signing the agreement parties are bound to abide all Security Council resolutions concerning Darfur. The preamble of the agreement explicitly says so. That will imply also possible future resolutions concerning a transition.
Would a UN force no longer be necessary now that there is peace? This was Lam Akols third point. It is a rather peculiar argument for a member of a government that has invited the United Nations to come to Sudan and help the parties to the earlier North-South peace agreement to keep that peace. It is even more necessary in Darfur than in South Sudan, because in Darfur there are still many forces that have not acceded to peace.
The African Union Peace and Security Council concluded its deliberations with a decision clearly stating that concrete steps had to be taken to prepare a transition towards a UN force. Until then the AU had only said to support such a transition 'in principle'. The reference to 'concrete steps' could not be misunderstood. In Khartoum the government seemed to understand this. The first reactions were less negative than expected, after having listened to the statement of Minister Lam Akol. However, already one day later the UN Security Council adopted a resolution urging Secretary General Kofi Annan to take such concrete steps. The paragraphs in that resolution were preceded by a reference to Chapter 7 of the Charter, which could be understood as preparing concrete steps towards a peace keeping mission without the consent of the Government of Sudan. It could also be interpreted otherwise. After all, Kofi Annan was only asked to send the assessment mission as soon as possible and to report the findings to the Security Council. Whether or not a peace keeping mission will be sent to Darfur still has to be decided. Moreover, the Security Council resolution was adopted by consensus, including Qatar, China and Russia, countries which are very cautious not to take a decision that would be misunderstood in Khartoum.
However, the Government of Sudan was quite annoyed. They thought that having signed a peace agreement would have given them at least the benefit of the doubt. “Nobody has congratulated us with the peace” was the general complaint amongst the politicians in Khartoum. The resolution, they felt, added insult to injury. This made the mission of Brahimi, Special Envoy of Kofi Annan, sent this week to Khartoum to consult the Government about a possible role for the United Nations in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement very difficult. In the press conference at the end of his visit Brahimi said that the passing of the resolution had been unfortunate. It did certainly not help him. The resolution was premature, because it had been agreed that consultations with the Government of Sudan would have to precede the sending of an assessment mission. However, Brahimi, a former minister of Foreign Affairs of Algiers, and since many years one of the most experienced diplomatic advisors of Kofi Annan, was able to dispel the Sudanese apprehensions. “Do you really believe that I, having fought colonialism in my country and later on elsewhere in Africa, at the end of my career would lend myself to support re-colonisation?”
President Beshir has agreed to the proposal to send an assessment mission to Darfur. That is the result of Brahimi's visit. So, we are one step further. The next steps will have to be taken later on. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mustafa has stated that the phase of confrontation between Sudan and the United Nations is over. “We are now entering the phase of negotiations”. Those negotiations will be difficult. Sudan is clearly of the opinion that the UN can only come under Chapter 6 of the Charter, that means: upon the invitation of the sovereign state Sudan. That would be an operation similar to the one in Southern Sudan. However, the Arab militia, the Janjaweed, the rogue commanders and the rebel movements that have not agreed to peace will require a much more robust mandate. The fact that since the peace agreement has been signed, four weeks ago, militia are still attacking villages and rebel positions, makes this all the more necessary.