Weblog nr 3
November 28, 2005
This week the seventh round of the Abuja talks between the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements will start. Will it be the last one, producing a peace agreement before the end of the year? The chances are diminishing. Since the end of the sixth round the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army SLM/A has become more and more internally divided. The movement has organized a conference in Haskenita, somewhat to the North of El Fashr, the capital of Darfur. It was meant to unite the various forces within the movement, but the Chairman, Abdul Wahid, did not agree. He remained absent. The conference elected his Secretary General Minnie Minawi as his successor. Since then numerous efforts have been made to re-unite or reconcile the two leaders and the forces behind them, but without success.
Minawi is a Zaghawa. His support comes in particular from Nort Darfur. Wahid is a Fur. He is stronger in South Darfur, especially in the western part of the Jebel Mara, a beautiful mountainous area, not easily accessible. Wahid had marginalized Minawi and his supporters during the previous rounds of the Abuja talks. He now pays the price for that attitude. Minawi considers himself elected in a legitimate way and rejects any claim from Wahid to represent the movement during the next round.
Photo: Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg (c)
During the last two weeks I went twice to Muhajeria in Darfur to talk with Minawi, his SLM Council and the military commanders supporting him. I argued that the United Nations cannot take a stance on internal matters in a movement and therefore cannot be expected to legalize the outcome of his conference. Moreover, nobody in the guerilla movement is clean. And whatever the legitimacy of the election may be, the most important question is whether signatures under a peace agreement will result in an end to the fightings. Will all commanders, including those who continue to support Wahid, abide and keep the ceasefire which should be a central element of a peace agreement? In order to ensure that this will be the case, Wahid cannot be excluded from the talks. Legitimacy is one thing, power is another.
Gradually Minawi showed some understanding and flexibility. Not all his colleagues did. Some described Wahid as a dictator, who should not be allowed to speak on their behalf. Others were so proud on their accomplishments - in their words: a democratic movement - that they considered all comments from outside a form of betrayal. However, besides the tribal dimensions and besides also the sheer jockeying for power between the various opponents, there is a clear hesitation amongst many people in Darfur, who previously had supported SLM, to accept the decisions of Haskenita. The conference, which many, including me, thought to be necessary in order to make it possible for the movement to get its act together, was organized in such a way that it became counterproductive.
Not everything is lost. If the upcoming talks are facilitated and chaired in a wise and flexible manner it is still possible to reach a result. A sustainable ceasefire between the Government and the rebel movements is a precondition for an effective disarmament of the real villains: the Janjaweed and Arab militia who continue to attack villages and kill indiscriminately unarmed farmers, women and children. In September the camp Aro Sharow and neighbouring villages in West Darfur were attacked by hundreds of such fighters on camel and horseback. Over thirty people were slaughtered. In October the village of Tama in South Darfur was fully destroyed. Here too more than thirty farmers were killed. In November villages around Gereida in South Darfur were attacked, resulting in many dozens of deaths. The government should stop it. It doesn't. They say that this is out of their control. Not many do believe this. To the extent that this is true, they are also responsible, because two years ago the Government decided to use the militia rather than the army to fight the SLM. The ghost is out of the bottle. The UN Security Council so far has not been willing to use its powers to enforce disarmament of these militia.
The African Union forces in Darfur cannot prevent these attacks either. They do an excellent job, but they are not robust and numerous enough and lack adequate equipment. The United Nations forces which are part of the mission which I lead have no mandate in Darfur.
So, the anomaly is that we need a peace agreement to protect the civilians in Darfur against the attacks by militia who themselves are not present at the negotiation table. Only after such a peace agreement SLM and the Government together could turn against these militia. Then also the Security Council could be persuaded to take more effective steps to ensure security on the ground. Without such a peace agreement more radical steps would be veto-ed by at least one of the permanent members of the Council.
All these and other arguments I used to persuade SLM that a peace agreement is essential to protect the people they claim to represent. Further internal strife, continuous jockeying for power and renewed delay tactics would make the present leadership of the rebel movements lose all their credibility.
Minawi is a Zaghawa. His support comes in particular from Nort Darfur. Wahid is a Fur. He is stronger in South Darfur, especially in the western part of the Jebel Mara, a beautiful mountainous area, not easily accessible. Wahid had marginalized Minawi and his supporters during the previous rounds of the Abuja talks. He now pays the price for that attitude. Minawi considers himself elected in a legitimate way and rejects any claim from Wahid to represent the movement during the next round.
Aerial view of a village in Darfur
Photo: Paula Souverijn-Eisenberg (c)
During the last two weeks I went twice to Muhajeria in Darfur to talk with Minawi, his SLM Council and the military commanders supporting him. I argued that the United Nations cannot take a stance on internal matters in a movement and therefore cannot be expected to legalize the outcome of his conference. Moreover, nobody in the guerilla movement is clean. And whatever the legitimacy of the election may be, the most important question is whether signatures under a peace agreement will result in an end to the fightings. Will all commanders, including those who continue to support Wahid, abide and keep the ceasefire which should be a central element of a peace agreement? In order to ensure that this will be the case, Wahid cannot be excluded from the talks. Legitimacy is one thing, power is another.
Gradually Minawi showed some understanding and flexibility. Not all his colleagues did. Some described Wahid as a dictator, who should not be allowed to speak on their behalf. Others were so proud on their accomplishments - in their words: a democratic movement - that they considered all comments from outside a form of betrayal. However, besides the tribal dimensions and besides also the sheer jockeying for power between the various opponents, there is a clear hesitation amongst many people in Darfur, who previously had supported SLM, to accept the decisions of Haskenita. The conference, which many, including me, thought to be necessary in order to make it possible for the movement to get its act together, was organized in such a way that it became counterproductive.
Not everything is lost. If the upcoming talks are facilitated and chaired in a wise and flexible manner it is still possible to reach a result. A sustainable ceasefire between the Government and the rebel movements is a precondition for an effective disarmament of the real villains: the Janjaweed and Arab militia who continue to attack villages and kill indiscriminately unarmed farmers, women and children. In September the camp Aro Sharow and neighbouring villages in West Darfur were attacked by hundreds of such fighters on camel and horseback. Over thirty people were slaughtered. In October the village of Tama in South Darfur was fully destroyed. Here too more than thirty farmers were killed. In November villages around Gereida in South Darfur were attacked, resulting in many dozens of deaths. The government should stop it. It doesn't. They say that this is out of their control. Not many do believe this. To the extent that this is true, they are also responsible, because two years ago the Government decided to use the militia rather than the army to fight the SLM. The ghost is out of the bottle. The UN Security Council so far has not been willing to use its powers to enforce disarmament of these militia.
The African Union forces in Darfur cannot prevent these attacks either. They do an excellent job, but they are not robust and numerous enough and lack adequate equipment. The United Nations forces which are part of the mission which I lead have no mandate in Darfur.
So, the anomaly is that we need a peace agreement to protect the civilians in Darfur against the attacks by militia who themselves are not present at the negotiation table. Only after such a peace agreement SLM and the Government together could turn against these militia. Then also the Security Council could be persuaded to take more effective steps to ensure security on the ground. Without such a peace agreement more radical steps would be veto-ed by at least one of the permanent members of the Council.
All these and other arguments I used to persuade SLM that a peace agreement is essential to protect the people they claim to represent. Further internal strife, continuous jockeying for power and renewed delay tactics would make the present leadership of the rebel movements lose all their credibility.