Weblog nr 34
October 1, 2006
The Darfur Peace Agreement is in coma. It is not dead, but it is dying. There is no intensive care. The life support system does not function.
Could a transition from the present African Union peace force to a United Nations force fulfill that function? Yes, of course, but up to a point. The African Union peace keepers have done a very good job, but presently they are much less effective than they used to be. They are too small and they lack resources. Promises from Western countries to support them have not been fully kept. There is not enough money to pay the soldiers, nor to feed them or to buy fuel for the military equipment. The AU each time has to beg around to get money for another month or two. This has been the practice throughout this year. It has demoralized the troops. A United Nations force can do a better job already for the reason that its presence would be guaranteed for a longer period. Its financial basis would be guaranteed, because all countries are obliged to contribute to the UN budget concerned. Peace keeping can not be done on a shoe string.
However, a robust peace keeping force is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The predicament of Darfur requires a political solution. Military presence in order to keep the peace is a condition, not a solution in itself. Military presence is required to keep a cease fire and to protect the people against attacks from all sides. Peace keeping by military has to go hand in hand with political efforts to tackle the root causes of the conflict. That may take years and for that reason we need a peace keeping force that can stay many years.
End August the United Nations Security Council passed a new resolution (nr 1706) aiming at the transition from an AU force to a UN force. It contains some paragraphs acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, enabling the force, if and when established, to prevent disruption of the implementation of the DPA, to protect civilians, to prevent attacks and to seize arms. This is rather strong language, very welcome. However, the establishment of the peace force itself can only take place with the consent of the Sudanese Government. In essence it is a Chapter 6 resolution. In paragraph 1 of the resolution the Security Council “invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment”.
So far the Government of Sudan has not accepted the invitation. Since February this year it has refused to let a UN force come to Darfur. The new resolution has not brought the Government to change its position. On the contrary, the Government has stated that the various resolutions are inspired by a hostile attitude against Sudan. The Defense Minister of Sudan said that a deployment of UN troops to Darfur would amount to a declaration of war. In his view targeting Sudan was part of a Western plan to re-colonize Arab land in the whole of the Middle East. His country, he said, was ready for a general mobilization to face up to the eventuality of a foreign occupation.
The statement by the Defense Minister is only one in a long series. All cabinet members belonging to the ruling party, the NCP, have made similar statements. Even Vice President Taha, often considered to be more nuanced, has stated in no unclear terms to reject a UN peace keeping force. It has brought him more close to the position of President Beshir, who had declared more that once, in meetings with foreign delegations, that he and his government had decided against the transition to a UN force. In such meetings President Beshir is polite, rather soft spoken, but firm, leaving no room for doubt. In his public appearances he is eloquent, using harsh language. He too accuses the UN of a hidden agenda and the Western countries of having a plan to occupy the country. All such statements incite the people.
Of course, good reading of the text of the Resolution of the Security Council and good listening to statements made by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan would reveal that there is no such plan. There will be no deployment against the consent of the Government. The Security Council could decide to launch a peace keeping force based on Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, allowing an intervention against the will of a sovereign state. However, it has refrained from doing so and invited the Government to give its consent. Moreover, a Chapter 7 decision would require unanimity in the Council amongst the permanent members, the US, the UK, France, Russia and China. It is very unlikely that such a consensus would emerge.
Resolutions of the Security Council ought to be implemented. This also refers to resolution 1706. However, the paragraph inviting the Government to give its consent is as vital an element of this resolution as all other paragraphs. The question is what to do if the Government continues to decline this invitation.
Last week I asked this question to the members of the Security Council, when I briefed the Council on the situation in Sudan and in particular Darfur. The full text of my address can be found on my website. It was a pretty gloomy address. The situation in Darfur has deteriorated since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May this year. I wrote about this earlier, amongst others in my web log nr 26 and 31. We seem to be in a complete deadlock. For this reason I spoke in the Council about a peace agreement in coma.
I did not get an answer to my question. This is understandable from a political point of view. Pressure on the Government of Sudan is needed and has to be increased. An open debate on alternatives would diminish that pressure. However, as I stated in the public discussion with members of the Security Council, following my briefing, as long as the alternative of a full Chapter 7 operation is impossible, it would be necessary to make it attractive to the Government of Sudan to accept the invitation. To threaten a Government that feels itself quite strong, without being capable to execute threat is counterproductive. To exert pressure by making loud statements does not help. Such statements only provoke the Sudanese authorities to make loud counterstatements. The result is an exchange of incriminations for home consumption mainly. We need mature diplomacy. We may even need to negotiate a package, whether we like it or not, consisting of give and take: Sudan could be offered, for instance, the lifting of trade sanctions, debt relief, the normalization of diplomatic relations (all due since the signing of the Nairobi peace agreement between North and South) and cooperation in the field of security.
In my statement I argued that, in order to break through the stalemate, all parties should get off the present collision course. We can not afford to lose time anymore. We lost already too much time this year.
End August the Government of Sudan told the African Union to leave the country if the AU only wished to stay in order to prepare the transition to a UN force. The mandate of the African Union ran until 30 September. The Government underlined this ultimatum by telling the AU that there should be no further troop rotations. Intense diplomatic deliberations and pressure have resulted in a withdrawal of the ultimatum. Thereupon the African Union has decided to prolong its mandate until the end of this calendar year, provided that adequate resources will be made available by the donor countries. As I indicated above, this is highly necessary. Presently the resources and the morale of the troops are so low that they function far below their capacity. In the meantime the UN has been requested to provide assistance to the AU. The Government of Sudan has agreed to such assistance, which is a sign that pressure and diplomacy can function. However, much more will be needed in order to change the ideological rejection of a full transition. Anyway, we have bought some time until 31 December this year.
We will have to use this time not only to enhance the capacity of the AU troops and to get an agreement concerning the transition. As I wrote above: these are necessary but not sufficient conditions. They are necessary: the African Union troops should stay until the deployment of UN troops. Presently that is foreseen for 31 December. If the AU troops would leave the road to the camps is open for attacks. It would result in a bloodbath.
However, this deployment of AU troops followed by UN troops is not sufficient to bring peace. In the short run we need to do everything to put life into the Darfur Peace Agreement and to save the peace. If there is no peace, it can not be kept. If there is no intensive care around the patient in coma he will die. A life support system would have to consist of more than a robust peace keeping force. It should also contain a political mechanism.
In my address to the Security Council I presented a 'five points, three months' plan for the period until the end of this year, in order to install a workable life support system for peace. First: bring all parties on board of the peace agreement. Do not exclude parties that so far did not sign the agreement from the peace process by demanding that they should first sign in order to allowed talking. Second: establish a truce between the parties that continue to fight despite the official cease fire. Third: reform the Cease Fire Commission. It should become fully representative and authoritative. It should address all violations of the cease fire. It should begin the process of zoning and demarcating the areas under control of the various parties. It should discuss the plan to stop and disarm the Janjaweed. Fourth: resume the discussion about the content of the Darfur Peace Agreement itself. Legally it is a good agreement; politically it has failed. The majority of the people in Darfur have lost faith in the agreement as it stands today. Without fully reopening the negotiations it should be possible to improve the text through consultations with in particular the Fur and with the displaced people.
My fifth point was the one I mentioned above: get off the collision course, both within Sudan as well as in the international debate. Use the Ramadan as a month of tranquility. Use the coming three months to reach a full consensus between the international community and Sudan by means of constructive talks rather than an exchange of accusations.
There is not much time left. The displaced people in the camps, the refugees across the border, the people living in no go areas that can not be reached by our relief workers, the villagers who continue to live in fear for renewed attacks by militia, Janjaweed, robbers as well as by government gun ships can not wait much longer.
Could a transition from the present African Union peace force to a United Nations force fulfill that function? Yes, of course, but up to a point. The African Union peace keepers have done a very good job, but presently they are much less effective than they used to be. They are too small and they lack resources. Promises from Western countries to support them have not been fully kept. There is not enough money to pay the soldiers, nor to feed them or to buy fuel for the military equipment. The AU each time has to beg around to get money for another month or two. This has been the practice throughout this year. It has demoralized the troops. A United Nations force can do a better job already for the reason that its presence would be guaranteed for a longer period. Its financial basis would be guaranteed, because all countries are obliged to contribute to the UN budget concerned. Peace keeping can not be done on a shoe string.
However, a robust peace keeping force is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The predicament of Darfur requires a political solution. Military presence in order to keep the peace is a condition, not a solution in itself. Military presence is required to keep a cease fire and to protect the people against attacks from all sides. Peace keeping by military has to go hand in hand with political efforts to tackle the root causes of the conflict. That may take years and for that reason we need a peace keeping force that can stay many years.
End August the United Nations Security Council passed a new resolution (nr 1706) aiming at the transition from an AU force to a UN force. It contains some paragraphs acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, enabling the force, if and when established, to prevent disruption of the implementation of the DPA, to protect civilians, to prevent attacks and to seize arms. This is rather strong language, very welcome. However, the establishment of the peace force itself can only take place with the consent of the Sudanese Government. In essence it is a Chapter 6 resolution. In paragraph 1 of the resolution the Security Council “invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment”.
So far the Government of Sudan has not accepted the invitation. Since February this year it has refused to let a UN force come to Darfur. The new resolution has not brought the Government to change its position. On the contrary, the Government has stated that the various resolutions are inspired by a hostile attitude against Sudan. The Defense Minister of Sudan said that a deployment of UN troops to Darfur would amount to a declaration of war. In his view targeting Sudan was part of a Western plan to re-colonize Arab land in the whole of the Middle East. His country, he said, was ready for a general mobilization to face up to the eventuality of a foreign occupation.
The statement by the Defense Minister is only one in a long series. All cabinet members belonging to the ruling party, the NCP, have made similar statements. Even Vice President Taha, often considered to be more nuanced, has stated in no unclear terms to reject a UN peace keeping force. It has brought him more close to the position of President Beshir, who had declared more that once, in meetings with foreign delegations, that he and his government had decided against the transition to a UN force. In such meetings President Beshir is polite, rather soft spoken, but firm, leaving no room for doubt. In his public appearances he is eloquent, using harsh language. He too accuses the UN of a hidden agenda and the Western countries of having a plan to occupy the country. All such statements incite the people.
Of course, good reading of the text of the Resolution of the Security Council and good listening to statements made by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan would reveal that there is no such plan. There will be no deployment against the consent of the Government. The Security Council could decide to launch a peace keeping force based on Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, allowing an intervention against the will of a sovereign state. However, it has refrained from doing so and invited the Government to give its consent. Moreover, a Chapter 7 decision would require unanimity in the Council amongst the permanent members, the US, the UK, France, Russia and China. It is very unlikely that such a consensus would emerge.
Resolutions of the Security Council ought to be implemented. This also refers to resolution 1706. However, the paragraph inviting the Government to give its consent is as vital an element of this resolution as all other paragraphs. The question is what to do if the Government continues to decline this invitation.
Last week I asked this question to the members of the Security Council, when I briefed the Council on the situation in Sudan and in particular Darfur. The full text of my address can be found on my website. It was a pretty gloomy address. The situation in Darfur has deteriorated since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May this year. I wrote about this earlier, amongst others in my web log nr 26 and 31. We seem to be in a complete deadlock. For this reason I spoke in the Council about a peace agreement in coma.
I did not get an answer to my question. This is understandable from a political point of view. Pressure on the Government of Sudan is needed and has to be increased. An open debate on alternatives would diminish that pressure. However, as I stated in the public discussion with members of the Security Council, following my briefing, as long as the alternative of a full Chapter 7 operation is impossible, it would be necessary to make it attractive to the Government of Sudan to accept the invitation. To threaten a Government that feels itself quite strong, without being capable to execute threat is counterproductive. To exert pressure by making loud statements does not help. Such statements only provoke the Sudanese authorities to make loud counterstatements. The result is an exchange of incriminations for home consumption mainly. We need mature diplomacy. We may even need to negotiate a package, whether we like it or not, consisting of give and take: Sudan could be offered, for instance, the lifting of trade sanctions, debt relief, the normalization of diplomatic relations (all due since the signing of the Nairobi peace agreement between North and South) and cooperation in the field of security.
In my statement I argued that, in order to break through the stalemate, all parties should get off the present collision course. We can not afford to lose time anymore. We lost already too much time this year.
End August the Government of Sudan told the African Union to leave the country if the AU only wished to stay in order to prepare the transition to a UN force. The mandate of the African Union ran until 30 September. The Government underlined this ultimatum by telling the AU that there should be no further troop rotations. Intense diplomatic deliberations and pressure have resulted in a withdrawal of the ultimatum. Thereupon the African Union has decided to prolong its mandate until the end of this calendar year, provided that adequate resources will be made available by the donor countries. As I indicated above, this is highly necessary. Presently the resources and the morale of the troops are so low that they function far below their capacity. In the meantime the UN has been requested to provide assistance to the AU. The Government of Sudan has agreed to such assistance, which is a sign that pressure and diplomacy can function. However, much more will be needed in order to change the ideological rejection of a full transition. Anyway, we have bought some time until 31 December this year.
We will have to use this time not only to enhance the capacity of the AU troops and to get an agreement concerning the transition. As I wrote above: these are necessary but not sufficient conditions. They are necessary: the African Union troops should stay until the deployment of UN troops. Presently that is foreseen for 31 December. If the AU troops would leave the road to the camps is open for attacks. It would result in a bloodbath.
However, this deployment of AU troops followed by UN troops is not sufficient to bring peace. In the short run we need to do everything to put life into the Darfur Peace Agreement and to save the peace. If there is no peace, it can not be kept. If there is no intensive care around the patient in coma he will die. A life support system would have to consist of more than a robust peace keeping force. It should also contain a political mechanism.
In my address to the Security Council I presented a 'five points, three months' plan for the period until the end of this year, in order to install a workable life support system for peace. First: bring all parties on board of the peace agreement. Do not exclude parties that so far did not sign the agreement from the peace process by demanding that they should first sign in order to allowed talking. Second: establish a truce between the parties that continue to fight despite the official cease fire. Third: reform the Cease Fire Commission. It should become fully representative and authoritative. It should address all violations of the cease fire. It should begin the process of zoning and demarcating the areas under control of the various parties. It should discuss the plan to stop and disarm the Janjaweed. Fourth: resume the discussion about the content of the Darfur Peace Agreement itself. Legally it is a good agreement; politically it has failed. The majority of the people in Darfur have lost faith in the agreement as it stands today. Without fully reopening the negotiations it should be possible to improve the text through consultations with in particular the Fur and with the displaced people.
My fifth point was the one I mentioned above: get off the collision course, both within Sudan as well as in the international debate. Use the Ramadan as a month of tranquility. Use the coming three months to reach a full consensus between the international community and Sudan by means of constructive talks rather than an exchange of accusations.
There is not much time left. The displaced people in the camps, the refugees across the border, the people living in no go areas that can not be reached by our relief workers, the villagers who continue to live in fear for renewed attacks by militia, Janjaweed, robbers as well as by government gun ships can not wait much longer.